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ABSTRACT 
Author: Sebastian Lourier 
Title: Strength and Weaknesses of NPV Analysis and its 
Application to Aircraft Value Modeling 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Business Administration in Aviation 
Year: 1999 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the Net Present Value (NPV) technique as 
a mean to forecast aircraft values and the analysis of aircraft value forecasting accuracy. 
The main part of the examination is the evaluation of the actual quality of aircraft 
appraisals. The appraisal evaluation is based on historical forecast accuracy 
determinations and on a comparison of 1998 aircraft value forecasts. The discussion of a 
survey conducted by the author in 1998, will reveal the disunity among the appraisers. 
The survey data was provided generously by the appraisers most recognized in the 
industry. A sensitivity analysis exhibits how strongly the NPV technique, which is 
widely used in order to determine aircraft values, is influenced by certain input variables. 
Furthermore, in this paper the importance of aircraft value forecasting and factors 
determining aircraft values will be discussed. Different forecasting techniques, currently 
used in the appraisal industry, will be explained and aircraft value forecasting results of 
Credit Lyonnais/PK Airfmance (CL/PK) and Avitas will be analyzed in regard to their 
V 
accuracy. The main findings were that forecast accuracy is poor for most aircraft, a high 
disunity among appraisers regarding current market values and finally that NPV results 
can differ significantly if assumptions in a model are changed slightly. In addition, 
possible suggestions on how to improve current models will be explained in the 
conclusion. 
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1 Introduction 
i 
1.1 Introduction to the research topic 
Evaluating an aircraft's value and forecasting it's future value is an extremely 
complex process. The difficulties involved in assessing aircraft values are generally 
underestimated. The assumption that aircraft values depreciate continuously from year to 
year is incorrect. In general, we associate lower values with the increased age of a 
product. A consumer product's value is expected to decrease because of wear, the 
competition from advanced or more fashionable products, and the expiration of 
warranties. Values of industrial products reflect the Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
revenue-generating capacity over the remaining economic life. The economic life ends 
when the operating costs exceed the revenue-generating capacity. Another crucial 
element determining the value of a product is the relationship between the supply and 
demand for that product. Since most products have relatively short lead times compared 
to an aircraft, imbalances of supply and demand are counterbalanced quickly in general. 
Changes of output in polypolistic markets with a multitude of manufactures, which exists 
for most of today's products, are achievable much faster than in the oligopolistic aircraft 
manufacturing industry. 
Due to the lead-times of at least 9 to 18 months and inflexible production rates, 
there exists a continuous imbalance between demand and supply of aircraft. Since air-
traffic growth is inconsistent, the result is either an over-capacity or under-capacity of 
aircraft available in the market. Over-capacity results in decreasing aircraft values while 
higher demand results in increasing aircraft values. To summarize, there are two main 
factors determining an aircraft's value. The first factor is the aircraft's revenue generating 
capacity, and the second is the imbalance of demand and supply for aircraft which is 
determined by the state of the airline industry cycle. 
Because a multitude of experience and data resources are required to forecast 
aircraft values, some aviation consultants have specialized in this area. Examples of 
appraisers are Avmark, Avitas, and Airclaims. Avmark publishes its Transport Aircraft 
Value forecast (TAV) annually while Avitas' Blue Book is published biannually. These 
companies provide information about current market values (CMVs) and future values 
for all commercial jet aircraft. 
Price 
't+n 
- Forecasted 
Prices 
Qg!7 - Forecasting 
Uncertainty 
Error 
t+n Time 
Figure 1. Forecasting Errors Increase Over Time. 
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The data are sorted by aircraft type and year of manufacture. In addition, the 
appraisers offer individual aircraft evaluations. Since the quality of an appraisal is very 
important for customers such as financial institutions, who base their investment 
decisions on the forecasted values, accuracy must be quantified. Figure 1 shows the 
general trend of decreasing forecast accuracy over time. Research needs to be conducted 
to find the forecast accuracy of models that are used by different appraisers. 
1.2 Problem definition 
The aviation industry and the financial world are recognizing the importance of 
future aircraft values. Commercial aircraft with price tags between $30 and $150 million 
are comparable to industrial plants, which create revenue. Unlike a plant, an aircraft has 
a very high mobility and can be sold throughout the world. As a result of mobility and a 
consistent trading currency, the U.S. dollar, aircraft are traded in one global market place. 
Dealing with a single market, it is very difficult to determine one single price for a 
specific used aircraft type. Even aircraft built at the same time with similar technical 
configurations that are equivalent in maintenance and wear & tear conditions are often 
traded at considerably different prices. How is this possible in a free market where the 
price is regulated by demand and supply? 
Aircraft deals are relatively infrequent compared to other products and prices are 
not quoted publicly. Therefore, there exists a lack of market transparency and trading 
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prices for similar equipment (Figure 2). In most cases even the prices for new equipment 
is inconsistent and deviates from the manufacturer's list prices. 
Price 
• m a x 
• min 
No trade 
maximum price airlines are willinq to pay 
-
^ ^ ^ p possible trade prices 
minimum price manufacturers are willing to receive 
No trade 
Figure 2. Price Range Versus One Equilibrium Price. 
Today as Boeing and Airbus are engaged in a major market-share combat, 
customers are offered new aircraft at high discounts. For instance, customers like the 
leading leasing companies such as International Lease Finance Cooperation (DLFC) or GE 
Capital Aviation Service (GECAS), generally ordering large volumes, are taking 
advantage of their strong bargaining position. The discounts negotiable for new aircraft 
normally depend on the economic cycle, but despite high demand, the desperate fight for 
market-share between Boeing and Airbus during 1996 and 1997 resulted in low profit 
margins for both manufacturers. The situation for the manufacturers became worse 
during the Asian economic crises when orders dropped and carrier canceled firm orders. 
One additional reason for varying aircraft prices is the high degree of 
customization. Especially the value of the buyer-furnished equipment (BFE) such as 
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seats, in-flight entertainment, galleys or toilets varies significantly. Consequently, the 
price for the same aircraft type depends on a customer's ordered configuration (Holloway, 
1992). 
The combination of varying new prices, customized configurations, and different 
technical conditions causes difficulties in the determining CMVs of used aircraft. Even 
more difficult is the task of predicting an aircraft's future value. 
Further inconsistency is caused by environmental regulations, which may affect 
the economic life of older aircraft. For example, the operation of Stage II aircraft will be 
prohibited in Europe after December 31, 1999 and in the USA after April 1, 2002. To 
avoid their phase out, many of these aircraft will undergo costly hushkitting or re-
engining programs. How to approach the valuation of these aircraft raises new headaches 
in the appraisal industry. The main source for uncertainty in aircraft value predictions is 
the economic condition of the airline industry. Predicting cycles in the cyclical airline 
industry is a very difficult task. Despite continuous industry growth, many specialists 
consider 1998 as the peak of the current boom. The probability of a downturn is a topic 
that is currently being discussed at length industry wide (OToole, 1999). 
In summary there exist two very important factors creating difficulties in the 
determination of current and future values of used commercial aircraft: 
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> A lack of information regarding aircraft transaction prices. 
> The differences in specifications and maintenance status of the aircraft mean 
that one price observation is not translatable to another aircraft. 
> Uncertainty about future demand for aircraft due to the cyclically of the airline 
industry 
1.3 Terminology 
When discussing aircraft values, it is important to use the correct terminology in 
order to avoid confusion between the most likely trading value and the theoretical base 
value. To prevent confusion it is essential to define the main types of values referred to 
throughout this paper. 
Bbase value: 
The first step in an aircraft or an aircraft type evaluation is to determine the base 
value. The main assumption in this process is that demand and supply for aircraft are in 
balance. Furthermore, it is assumed that the aircraft is in half-life maintenance condition, 
in standard configuration, in standard specification, and complies with all regulations 
required by aviation authorities. An aircraft is in half-life condition if it is between two 
D-checks. The revenue generating capacity is calculated based on anticipated average 
direct operating cost (DOC), average utilization, average stage length, standard yields and 
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service life. The NPV of all expected future cash flows represents the base value of an 
aircraft (Hallerstrom, 1998). 
When addressing the problematic nature of aircraft values, it is crucial to be 
consistent with the terms used. The Base Value, according to the definition of the 
International Society of Transport Aircraft Trading (ISTAT) is the aircraft's inherent 
long-term value in a market where supply and demand are relatively in balance (ISTAT, 
1997). This definition also assumes that an aircraft is sold in an open, stable, unrestricted 
market in the absence any abnormal conditions, such as artificially limited marketing 
time. 
Economic value: 
The concept of economic value relates to an asset's ability to generate positive 
after tax cash flows. An investor anticipates that expected future cash flows and the 
resale or salvage value of the asset itself will provide compensation for the present value 
given up. Not only the future cash flow but especially a representative discount rate 
needs to be identified. The sum of the discounted positive or negative future cash flows 
resulting from an investment represent the value of the underlying asset. Furthermore, 
the discount rate takes in consideration the risk involved in an investment. In other 
words, the probability that the expected cash flows will actually be received. Risk 
adjusted discount rates add a premium to offset the investor for the extra risk of holding 
the asset. The economic value is not absolute but represents the relative risk assessment 
of an investor's expectation (Helfert, 1991). 
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Economic value is a trade-off concept because a buyer's willingness to pay 
depends on the assets expected cash flow generating potential. The Economic Value 
concept needs to be considered as the core analysis technique for business investments, 
operating and financing decisions. 
Trading value: 
Throughout this paper, the most likely trading values will be refereed to as current 
and future market values. The price for an asset paid in an actual transaction is referred 
to as market value or fair market value. Transactions take place in organized markets 
such as the New York Stock Exchange, or between private parties. One condition for the 
market value is that the parties involved are free of duress. In market-oriented 
economies, the market value is determined by the interaction of supply and demand. 
Expressed graphically, the intersection of a supply curve and demand curve represent the 
value marginally agreed to by a satisfied seller and buyer (Moger, 1990). Buyers' 
maximum willingness to pay and the minimum prices at which sellers are willing to trade 
is expressed by the demand and supply curves respectively. 
In an equilibrium market the expected rate of return on the asset is equal to the 
investors' marginal required rate of return. Due to changing conditions, expectations in 
regard to the asset's future cash flow generating capacity alter, and as a result the market 
shifts into disequilibrium. Changing conditions are reflected in the up or down 
movement of market price until a new equilibrium price is established. Sources for 
changing conditions can be of different nature. Changing preferences or perceptions of 
the parties involved as well as psychological climate, economic variations, industry 
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developments political conditions, etc. can cause the occurrence of market 
disequilibriums. 
For frequently-traded assets such as stocks and bonds the market value is well 
known instantly, even though millions of transactions result in daily and hourly 
variations. Unless a transaction takes place, market values assigned to infrequently traded 
assets, such as aircraft, are estimates. Estimating realistic transaction values for 
infrequently traded assets can become an extremely difficult task (Helfert, 1991). The 
qualities of market value estimates depend on the validity of assumptions in regard to 
individual preferences and economic conditions. 
Finding the market value or the most likely trading value for an aircraft, the base 
value, which neglects the imbalance of supply and demand, needs to be adjusted for the 
current market condition. Only then does the value reflect what a buyer would be willing 
to pay for that aircraft at that point in time. In order to forecast aircraft values, the base 
value is calculated for each year of the forecast horizon. Subsequently, the base value is 
adjusted for technology advancement and environmental regulations, which could affect 
the service life of a specific aircraft type. In order to forecast the most likely trading 
value or market value, each forecasted base value is adjusted for the predicted demand 
imbalance. 
The CMV, according to ISTAT, is the price the aircraft would most likely sell for 
in today's market, also called fair market value. The CMV depends primarily on the 
stage in the economic cycle and is adjusted for the actual technical status and the 
maintenance condition of the aircraft. 
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Book Value: 
An asset's book value is an accounting value, representing the prevailing 
depreciation policy and accounting principles in certain legislation. Book values are 
generally determined independently from economic values. They are based on historic 
acquisition costs. Known as the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS), 
the US depreciation policy assigns different recovery periods to certain classes of assets 
instead of using each asset's individual economic life in order to calculate depreciation 
allowances. As a result of the MACRS system, introduced after the 1986 tax reform, the 
depreciable life of assets has been shortened, so that businesses can increase their cash 
flows due to larger tax deductions. Thus the book value does not represent an asset's 
complete future earning potential since the depreciable life can be significantly shorter 
than the economic life span. The usefulness of book values in financial analysis is 
therefore limited. 
Summary: 
Discussing asset values requires careful definition of terminology used. The main 
concepts of asset values referred to in the following analysis will be economic value (base 
value) and market value (current and future). The economic value represents the NPV of 
future cash flows in an equilibrium market. The market value represents estimated or 
actual transaction prices of assets with regard to the prevailing conditions of supply, 
demand and the overall economic situation. 
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1.4 Basis for Discussion 
The objective of this study is to show that aircraft value forecasts based on the 
capitalization methods are very sensitive to key variables. If changes in some variables 
such as load-factors or the cost of capital result in significant variations in an aircraft's 
value, can the NPV methods yield accurate results? The calculations of net cash flows 
for the NPV analysis, require the forecast of revenues and costs for up to 30 years. 
Looking backwards only 10 years, the volatility of the airline business is easily 
recognized. The accuracy of 30 year forecast is therefore very doubtful. The industry 
does not have a united opinion about its short-term profitability perspectives. While 
analyst predict an over capacity and yields are already diminishing in 1999, the airlines 
continue to add seats to the system. 
The second objective is to evaluate the NPV methodology in the light of historic 
and current forecast results. The analysis aims also to explain the importance of cyclical 
swings in the airline industry resulting from supply and demand imbalances. It is 
examined if the cyclically is incorporated by the appraising industry in their forecasted 
aircraft values. 
1.5 Methodology 
Due to the fact that forecasting aircraft values is a very complex issue, a 
significant part of this paper is dealing with explanations regarding the topic. From the 
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question who needs aircraft values over factors affecting aircraft values to the techniques 
used in the aircraft appraising industry the author provides an extensive overview of the 
topic. Three research areas will be examined in the chapters following the coverage of 
the literature and the fundamentals of appraising theory. 
I. Survey about aircraft value expectations of industry's leading appraisers 
II. Forecast accuracy analysis and comparison for three forecasting models 
III. Application of a NPV technique and Sensitivity Analysis 
I. While the appraisers use different CMVs and also individual forecasting 
models, it would be interesting to see how much variance their projections bear in 
comparison to each other. Due to the lack of experience combined with an incomplete 
understanding of the aircraft finance market, most lenders depend on the appraisal 
industry. Banks are mainly interested in short-term gain. To realize the gains investors 
need accurate information about the asset current and future values. In order to find out if 
there is agreement in the industry regarding future aircraft values this survey was 
conducted. It was essential to define exactly what data was needed. In the survey the 
aircraft engine combination and the year of manufacture were specified. Furthermore, the 
appraisers were asked to provide the most likely trading values for aircraft in half-life 
condition. June 30th 1998 was asked as the reference date. 
Different inflation rates could result in wrong interpretation of the compared data. 
In order to find the constant dollars values, the current dollar figures will be discounted at 
the inflation rates, assumed by the appraisers. The constant dollar values will represent 
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the expected values depending on the revenue generating capacity and the market 
regardless of the applied inflation rates. The base values are supposed to reflect 
equilibrium markets, which in reality occur very seldom. 
The following list includes the year of manufacture, the type, and the engines of 
the analyzed aircraft (Table 1). There are two reasons why new aircraft are not included 
in this survey. New aircraft have a very specific depreciation pattern during the first years 
and they not traded frequently. 
Table 1 
Survey Aircraft Types 
YoB 
1989 
1986 
1978 
1990 
1980 
1982 
1991 
Aircraft type 
B-737-300 
MD-83 
DC-10-30 
B-757-200 
B-747-200B 
A300B4-200 
A320-200 
Engine type 
CFM56-3 B2 
JT8D-217/219 
CF6-50 C2 
RB211-535E4 
JT9D-7 
CF6-50C2 
CFM-56-5A 
The forecasted aircraft values will be sorted by aircraft type and then plotted along 
a time axis. The variance can then be determined by the calculation of the mean and the 
standard deviation for each aircraft type. This information is also useful for the analysis 
by aircraft size. By dividing the aircraft into two groups, wide-bodies and narrow-bodies, 
it will be possible to see if the variance in the appraiser's forecasts depends on the aircraft 
size. 
II. Measuring forecast accuracy is not an easy task. Obviously one can only 
evaluate historical forecasts because the outcome of today's prognostication will not be 
available before the actual point in time. 
In order to measure the accuracy of a forecast made in the past, one needs to 
compare each actual aircraft CMVs with the forecasted values. As will be explained in a 
following chapter, it is hard to find one current market value for a specific aircraft type 
delivered in a certain year. Appraiser's CMV estimates can vary significantly. Actual 
transaction data for an aircraft type of the same age, if available, can only be found as a 
range of values, because of different technical conditions and specifications. Real 
transaction prices reflect aircraft's different technical conditions and configurations but 
depend also on the negotiation skills and bargaining power of the parties involved. It is 
important to understand that it is impossible to compare someone's forecasted value with 
one single actual value, because such a single value does not exists. The CMVs available 
from different sources show a high degree of variation. 
One possibility to calculate the forecast accuracy is to assume that one appraiser's 
historical CMVs are correct. Then, it is possible to compare the forecast of this appraiser 
with its CMVs and calculate the deviation. Another approach would be to take a pool of 
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appraisers and calculate the average of historical market values. The later approach is not 
practical because data availability is limited. 
There are several methods to determine forecast accuracy. Possible accuracy 
analysis could be conducted by year of forecast, by forecast horizon, by aircraft type, by 
aircraft groups or by a combination of these criteria. 
Figure 3. DC-10 Current Market Values and Forecasted Values. 
Since the aircraft values are correlated to the airline industry cycles it is critical to 
evaluate a forecast on a long-term basis. As can be seen in Figure 3, a forecast can be 
very accurate for a short period but inaccurate in the long run. The Graph shows a fictive 
straight line value forecast from 1972 and the actual market values for a DC 10. A 
shortage on the supply side resulted in increasing values during the late 1970's and late 
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1980's. Due to the fact that the boom periods of the airline industry were not incorporated 
in the straight line appraisal, the forecast accuracy during theses periods was very low. 
Analyzing this fictive forecast, it can be found that most of the actual values vary 
considerably from the forecasted values. The mean of the error in that example is 
approximately 31%. However, for the first 5 years the average error is only 0.5%. For 
one forecast, the accuracy results can be very different if the criteria are changed. 
In order to find comparable results, the author choose to use the forecast horizon 
and individual aircraft types as criteria in the forecast accuracy analysis. Thereby it is 
possible to find how large the error is in relation to the forecast horizon. For one specific 
aircraft type, build in year X a row of consecutive forecast is examined. All forecasts 
with a one year horizon are then compared with the actual values. The average of these 
forecast errors is calculated and specifies the accuracy of the appraisal for a one year 
forecast horizon. The same procedure is applied to two-year, three-year, etc. forecast 
horizons. In addition to the mean, the standard deviation for each forecasting horizon is 
calculated, too. Finally, the mean and ± 1 standard deviation are plotted with the forecast 
horizon on the X-axis and the percentage on the Y-axis. Figure 4 shows an example of 
such a graph. Knowing the specific error and also the standard deviation for a certain 
period enables an investor to evaluate the risk of a deal. After determining the 
forecasting accuracy for each of the 7 aircraft types specified earlier for the survey, the 
accuracy can also be used to evaluate both narrow-bodies and wide-bodies. The only 
problem occurs if recent forecasts are analyzed. For example, values projected in 1995 
can only be compared with the 1996, 1997, and 1998 data. Consequently, only three 
forecasts would determine the average forecast accuracy for 1995. The problem of 
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loosing statistically significance when using only a few data points can be avoided by 
neglecting the most recent forecasts. Therefore, only the first half of each forecast period 
is used to determine the accuracy of the model. For a better understanding of the 
technique used an example will now be discussed in detail. 
In the first row of Table 2 it is specified in which half of the year each forecast 
started. The second row represents the CMVs at the time of the forecast. These are the 
actual data, which will be compared with the forecasted data listed in each column. The 
first column contains the forecast horizon in years. For 1993, the forecast horizon is 5.5 
years and decreases to 0 for 1998. Thus, the further back the forecast was made, the more 
data is available to be compared with actual historic market values. Each forecasted 
value has a corresponding actual CMV listed in the first row. In 93/1 the predicted value 
for 93/2 was $26.07 million. With the corresponding actual value in 93/2 being $27.50 
million, the error was $-1.43 million or -5.5% (Gray fields in Table 2). This forecast 
error in percent is listed in the 3rd row/4th column in Table 3. The result of each 
comparison is listed in the calculation sheet (Table 3) where the mean of the error and the 
standard deviation for each forecasting horizon is calculated. Mean and Standard 
deviation can be used to determine the confidence level for each forecast horizon. Due to 
an insufficient number of values, forecast horizons resulting in less than 4 comparisons 
(gray cells) are excluded from the analysis. A simple transition of these tables into graphs 
is helpful in determining the forecast accuracy. Figure 4 visualizes the variation of 
forecasted and actual values. 
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Table 2 
Example of Input Sheet for Historical Forecasts of Aircraft Values 
Horizon 
years 
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
4.5 
5.0 
5.5 
Forecasts from 1993 (first half) to 199 
93/1 
27.50 
26.07 
24.63 
23.35 
22.33 
21.60 
21.15 
20.93 
20.84 
20.80 
20.76 
20.69 
93/2 
27.50 
25.90 
24.50 
23.38 
22.58 
22.10 
21.88 
21.81 
21.78 
21.76 
21.71 
94/1 
27.40 
25.39 
24.12 
23.24 
22.73 
22.51 
22.47 
22.49 
22.52 
22.50 
94/2 
27.40 
23.72 
22.78 
22.25 
22.06 
22.06 
22.13 
22.21 
22.24 
95/1 
27.20 
23.52 
22.94 
22.76 
22.80 
22.93 
23.08 
23.17 
95/2 
27.20 
22.39 
22.24 
22.34 
22.53 
22.74 
22.89 
8 (second half) / (m 
96/1 
22.27 
22.15 
22.31 
22.60 
22.90 
23.14 
96/2 
20.74 
20.98 
21.36 
21.76 
22.09 
97/1 
22.14 
22.71 
23.30 
23.82 
illion $US) 
97/2 
21.50 
22.20 
22.81 
98/1 
22.00 
22.74 
98/2 
21.50 CMVs 
F 
O 
R 
E 
C 
A 
S i 
T 
T 
Source: Data created for Example 
Table 3 
Example of Mean and Standard Deviation Calculation Sheet 
Jlorizon 
years 
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
1 2.5 
3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
4.5 
5.0 
5.5 
MEAN 
0.00% 
-3.31% 
-3.42% 
-3.06% 
-2.52% 
-0.37% 
2.50% 
2.39% 
0.17% 
-0.01% 
-2.50% 
-3.91% 
STDEV 
0.00% 
!7.72% 
9.48% 
11.03% 
11.56% 
11.79% 
4.17% 
3.42% 
4.35% 
4.02% 
4.91% 
Mean Error Calculation Sheet for Table 2 Data 
93/1 93/2 94/1 94/2 95/1 95/2 96/1 96/2 97/1 97/2 98/1 98/2 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
-5.5% -5.8% -7.9% -14.7% -15.6% 0.5% 6.4% -5.5% 5.3% 0.9% 5.5% 
-11.2% -11.8% -12.8% -19.4% 2.9% 6.7% 0.8% -0.7% 5.6% 5.7% 
-17.3% -16.3% -17.0% -0.1% 8.9% 0.9% 4.9% -1.1% 9.7% 
-21.8% -20.5% 2.0% 6.0% 2.9% 4.6% 3.9% 2.7% 
-25.9% -0.8% 7.9% -0.4% 6.2% 3.3% 7.1% 
-5.3% 5.2% 1.5% 2.8% 4.7% 6.1% 
0.9% -1.5% 4.4% 0.9% 7.2% 
-6.2% 1.3% 2.3% 3.3% 
-3.4% -1.1% 4.4% 
-6.0% 1.0% 
-3.9% 
negative data represent underestimated forecasts / positive data represent overestimated forecasts 
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CMVs and Projections 
— CMVs Projections 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Source: Example Data 
1998 
Figure 4. Historic Market Values and Biannual Forecasts. 
In this example the forecasted values were to low before 1996. After that year the 
gray lines are very close to the black line which is a sign for very high forecasting 
accuracy. The mean of the error and the standard deviation for each forecast horizon, as 
calculated in Table 3, is easier to evaluate when plotted in a graph. From Figure 5, it can 
be recognized that for a forecast horizon of up to 3 years the mean of the error is 
relatively consistent by about negative 3%. A standard deviation as low as 10% is also an 
indicator for good accuracy. The upper and lower gray lines represent ±1 standard 
deviation while the bold black line represents the systematic error. Assuming a normal 
distribution of the error, it can be concluded that in 68% the forecast was within ±1 
standard deviation. For example for values projected 2 years ahead, only 32% of the 
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Forecasting Accuracy - Systematic Error & Standard 
Deviation 
30.00% 
-+1 STDEV 
• Mean 
•-1 STDEV 
forecast 
horizon in 
years 
Figure 5. Mean and +/- One Standard Deviation of an Example Forecast. 
predictions were more than 11.6 % off the actual values. This analysis will be conducted 
for each of the 7 aircraft types examined in this paper. 
III. The third part of the analysis is a practical application of the NPV technique. 
The essential inputs to a NPV analysis are future cash flows. In the analysis revenues and 
expenses from 1985 to 1998 build the foundation for the cash flow determination. By 
adding a trend-line, the expenses and revenues per available seat mile (ASM) can be 
extrapolated, so that 30-year operating time frame can be simulated. Using B737 
operational data and historic utilization data of this equipment, the ASM can be 
determined. By multiplying 365 days with average industry data of daily hours of 
utilization, seating capacity and block-speed ("average speed in statute miles per hour of 
an aircraft, between the time the aircraft first moves under its own power for purposes of 
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flight until it comes to rest at the next point of landing", Wells, 1999), the historic average 
ASMs for the B737 used in the example, can be determined. By adding a trend-line to 
the result the future ASMs can be projected. From an analysis of the utilization of old 
equipment by major airlines, it was found that the utilization of old equipment has a 
decreasing tendency. This trend is incorporated in the prediction of the ASM. The 
multiplication of the ASMs with difference of revenue per ASM and the expenses per 
ASM leads to the net cash flows. Discounting and adding the expected cash flows to the 
date of the evaluation returns the value of the aircraft. Using this example as a base case, 
a sensitivity analysis can be conducted in order to show the influence of the discount rate. 
The data for these calculations are available from the Airline Monitor and the Air 
Transport Association of American (ATA). 
In order to analyze the impact of the different cost and revenue components, such 
as fuel-cost, labor-cost or load factors, a scenario analysis is conducted. Using a NPV 
model designed and provided by Edmund Greenslet, the editor of the Airline Monitor, 
the impact of changes in input variables on aircraft values can be found. As Table 4 
shows, cost and revenues in the model are broken down into their main composites. In 
the version of the model used, 1993 data are actual while the years before and after are 
decreased or increased by an escalation formula developed from historical data. 
Table 4 
Variables Examined in an NPV-Scenario Analysis 
Revenue variables 
Yield 
Utilization 
Loadfactor 
Expense variables 
Flying Labor/ Block Hour 
Fuel perGallon-0 
Fuel/ Block Hour 
Maintenance/ Block Hour 
result in 
Passenger Revenue 
Cargo & Other Revenue 
SUM =TOTAL REVENUE 
Block Hour Cost 
Marketing, General, Administration, etc. 
Ownership Cost 
SUM = TOTAL EXPENSES 
2 Literature Review 
This chapter gives an overview about general topics related to aircraft appraising 
and also about research literature related to the application of the NPV method to aircraft 
value modeling. 
2.1 History of value theory - Economical view 
Although slightly deviating from the main topic, asset valuation and valuation 
theory, the contribution of popular economists on value theory is helpful in understanding 
today's valuation methodologies. While valuation theorists concentrate on identifying the 
sources and basis of worth in an asset, valuation theory is the process of estimating the 
specific value of any asset. Value theory is considered the root of valuation theory. 
Comparative methods or reproduction cost methods were the techniques 
frequently applied in the early stages of valuation. An expression used at this time was 
the just price. Just price was supposed to be equivalent to the cost of labor required to 
produce a specific good. 
William Petty (1627 1687), a pre-classical scientist attempted to objectively 
explain laws of reality. Part of his studies included defining market value. Petty believed 
that dependent on factors of production, land and labor, the actual price of any asset was 
continuously fluctuating around the natural value. It was Richard Cantillon (1688 - 1734) 
who had a similar idea and developed the land theory. According to Cantillon, the 
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intrinsic value of any good could be expressed in units of land. He used a model to 
transform the amount of labor into units of land. Nicholas Barbon (1640 -1698) was 
convinced that the value of a good was equal to the market price, which he thought to be 
determined by the supply of articles available (Fogarty, 1996). Barbon further stated that 
the value of all wares was determined by their use and that useless items had no value. 
Since he differentiated between two general wants desired by mankind, the wants of the 
body and the wants of the mind, he inferred that all things are useful and therefore have a 
value. He believed that the surplus of a ware resulted in low values and conversely, 
scarcity drove prices up (Barbon, 1690). 
In contradiction to Petty and Cantillon, John Locke (1632-1704) found land to be 
valueless and labor to be the determinant of value. While also recognizing also the forces 
of supply and demand, Locke was convinced that labor was the equivalent of production 
cost and that labor was the only source of value. The most popular classical economists, 
such as Adam Smith (1723-1790), John Stuart Mill (1806 1873), David Ricardo (1772-
1823) and Karl Marx (1818-1883), emphasized cost of production and sacrifices as main 
determinants in their value theories (Wendt, 1974). Applying the "water diamond 
paradox" used by John Law (1772 - 1823) in his explanations on demand and supply 
theory, Adam Smith found that "labor is the real price and money is the nominal price" 
(Meek, 1973). According to Marx the value of a commodity is determined by the amount 
of sacrifice and labor it contains (Ballard, 1995). Toward the end of the 19th century, the 
Neo-Classical era, it seemed that scientists finally found a method explaining value. 
William Jevons (1835 1882) and Carl Menger (1840 - 1921) in 1871 developed the 
marginal utility theory. Their main thesis was that "value depends entirely on utility" 
(Fogarty 1996). Leon Walras (1834-1910) did not agree to this simple causal link 
between utility and value. His theoretical model of General Equilibrium was an 
integration of cost of production (supply) and utility (demand). Walras' model included 
more complex interrelations between different variables and the economic system. It was 
Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) who resolved the controversy about the search for a single 
determinant for value. Marshall recognized the interdependence of utility and cost of 
production, and he took into consideration another variable: time. Marshall was the first 
one to apply the time factor to plant size and thereby to supply. This made supply the 
main determinant for value in the long term. In the short term, Marshall found supply to 
be fixed and value to be solely determined by demand. 
It can be concluded that the historic debate surrounding the determinants of value 
persisted for so long because economists tried always to find a one-dimensional (supply-
oriented) explanation for their value theories. After recognizing that value is a function 
of both utility and cost of production, Marshall became the pioneer of today's three basic 
valuation methods: replacement cost, market comparison, and capitalization of income. 
While Marshall considered the discounted value of future returns only as the value 
for old machines (assets), it was Irving Fisher who defined value as "simply the present 
worth of the future income from the specified income" (Fisher, 1906). In 1930 Gustav 
Cassel subscribed to Marshall's and Fisher's capitalization of income theory, but added 
his principle of cost. In Cassel's opinion the actual price oscillates around a "normal 
condition" (Wendt, 1974). R. Bye, an advocate of Cassel's ideas, differentiated between 
ideal market conditions and actual market conditions. The theoretical value is also called 
normal value, such as calculated in the capitalization of income method. Both represent 
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the value of a good in an ideal market, where supply and demand are in equilibrium. The 
actual value or market value is higher or lower than normal value since in reality demand 
and supply are seldomly in equilibrium. During the 20th century, economists examined 
the behavior of values and prices under various conditions. Finally, today's economists 
place emphasis mainly upon the determination of prices for new products (Wendt, 1974). 
2.2 Asset Valuation - Financial concepts 
For any business the motivation for an investment is to generate positive cash 
flows. The price or the value of an industrial good like an aircraft should therefore 
represent the income generating potential covering the cost incurred as well as the profit 
generating capacity. Due to the fact that capital investments have long-term 
characteristics, investment decisions need to take into account the time value of money. 
Also, the investment decision's compatibility with the company's strategic perspective 
and the economic impact on a firm's overall performance need to be taken into 
consideration. In contradiction to capital expenditures, which result in benefits for the 
following year only, the process of planning and managing a firm's acquisitions of assets 
creating returns in excess of one year is called capital budgeting (Ross, 1993). 
Substantial in-depth analysis is required to make capital budgeting decisions, as 
theses decisions determine a firm's future direction. A wrong decision can have severe 
consequences and generally not reversible without incurring high costs or write-offs. An 
example is a small airline taking delivery of a new wide-body jet during a recession. Due 
to low load-factors, the aircraft would not generate the desired cash flows. If the airline 
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decided to sell the aircraft in order to pay debt it might face a low resale value since 
demand for wide-body aircraft would be very low in times of diminishing load-factors. 
As a result, the airline would incur a high loss on behalf of the wrong investment 
decision. 
The time value of money: 
Cash flows can vary in magnitude as well as in timing. Thus, it is necessary to compare 
cash flows in different points of time. According to the equivalence concept, the value of 
a sum of money today is equal to a different sum of money in the past or in the future 
(Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. The Time Value of Money. 
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In other words, one unit of money possessed today is worth more than the same 
one unit in the future. The difference between the value of $1 today and $1 in the future 
is a function of time and cost of capital. The explanation for the time value of money 
concept is that a dollar invested in t=to can be invested and generate at least the interest 
paid by a bank. For the case that the money is invested longer than one investment period 
(P>Pi-Po), the interest earned in the first period can be added to the principal and generate 
additional interest in the second period. Earning interest on interest is called 
compounding process (Harvey, C. R. 1998). Compounding is used in the process of 
finding the present value (PV) of future cash flows (FV). The present value is a tool to 
compare cash flows independently from their timing (Moyer, 1990). 
py _ FV k = discount rate / (interest) (1 ) 
"(i+*y 
t = number of time periods 
In order to evaluate different investment options returning different cash flows at different 
points in time, the present value concept is an essential tool. 
Net Present Value: 
For real investment projects, including inconsistent series of cash inflows and 
outflows, a more sophisticated concept needs to be applied. Widely used for investment 
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analysis, the NPV is used to find an investment's expected value in current dollars after 
deducting all arising costs (Moyer, 1990). 
MPV-^NCF, (2) 
NPV = present value of the project 
NCF = Net cash flow (Inflows - Outflows) 
k = cost of capital (required rate of return / riskiness of the estimated cash flows) 
t = year 
n = expected project life 
Costs such as interest are not included in the incremental cash flows. The 
discount rate reflects the cost of capital, which is the minimum required rate of return for 
a project in that risk category. In order to determine if the project is profitable, future 
cash flows are discounted at the required rate of return, which is equal to the cost of 
capital. The market-determined required rate of return depends on the market's perceived 
level of risk associated with the investment. The market valuation theory reflects the 
process of adding a risk premium, generally the market average, to the risk free rate. The 
discount rate derived from the CAPM reflects the return required by investors for a 
project's specific risk. Figure 7 displays the market valuation process. 
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Figure 7. Market Valuation Theory. 
K = K R F + P ( K m - K R F ) ( 3 ) 
The expected return of an individual security (K) is equal to the current risk-free rate 
(KRF) plus the Beta of the security (li) multiplied with the historical market risk premium 
(Km-KRJ.) (Ross, 1993). 
The estimated future cash flows of a project are discounted at the rate derived 
form the market valuation theory in order to find the NPV or market value. A positive 
NPV represents additional wealth created by the project. 
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In Figure 8 the NPV or the black line represents the value of an aircraft. By 
discounting the future net cash flows (total annually revenue - total annually cost = net 
cash flow) for each year, the NPV's or aircraft values for each year in the future can be 
derived. 
$ (000) 
40,000 
35,000 
30,000 
25,000 
20,000 
15,000 
10,000 
5,000 
0 
1989-B737-300 NPV @ 3% dicount rate 
E^3 Total Revenue (000) l = 3 Total Costs (000) " 'Basic Value 
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 
Source: Edmund Greenslet 
Year: 
Revenue(000) 
Costs (000) 
Profit (000) 
Basic Value 
Year: 
Revenue(000) 
Total Costs (000) 
Pretax Profit (000 
Basic Value 
1999 
21,540 
18,276 
3,264 
23,877 
2009 
28,948 
25,852 
3,095 
17,136 
2000 
22,186 
19,410 
2,776 
23,479 
2010 
29,816 
26,594 
3,222 
16,561 
2001 
22,852 
19,941 
2,911 
23,520 
2011 
30,711 
27,359 
3,351 
15,810 
2002 
23,537 
20,489 
3,048 
23,431 
2012 
31,632 
28,149 
3,482 
14,858 
2003 
24,243 
21,055 
3,188 
22,035 
2013 
32,581 
28,965 
3,616 
13,681 
2004 
24,971 
22,059 
2,911 
21,651 
2014 
33,558 
29,807 
3,751 
12,249 
2005 
25,720 
22,677 
3,043 
21,483 
2015 
34,565 
30,677 
3,888 
10,531 
2006 
26,491 
23,314 
3,177 
20,056 
2016 
35,602 
31,575 
4,027 
8,490 
2007 
27,286 
23,972 
3,313 
19,604 
2017 
36,670 
32,501 
4,169 
6,086 
2008 
28,105 
24,652 
3,453 
18,974 
2018 
37,770 
33,458 
4,312 
3,273 
Figure 8. Aircraft Values for a 1989 B737-300 as a Result Net Cash Flows. 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR): 
The ERR represents the discount rate, which leads to a break even of future cash 
flows with the initial investment. The IRR is the discount rate at which a project's NPV 
is equal to zero. Therefore the IRR specifies the minimum required rate of retro for an 
investment. 
NPV = ± NCF
 = 0 
^{l+IRR) 
2.3 Related research literature 
Leading Indicators for Aircraft Valuation (van Donselaar, 1998): 
M. van Donselaar examines factors affecting aircraft values. He distinguishes 
between three categories: macro-economic, meso-economic and micro-economic factors. 
In the category of Macro-economic indicators, world gross domestic product (GDP) is 
defined as the most important leading indicator for used commercial aircraft. The 
International Monetary Fond predicted a 3.7% GDP growth rate for 1999 and an average 
of 4.5% for the year 2000 to 2003 (van Donselaar, 1998). During the three major 
recessions since 1970, the GDP growth level was lower than 2%. The GDP affects the 
four remaining leading macro economic indicators which are: world traffic growth, load 
factors, world fleet size (orders, deliveries and retirements) and interest/inflation rates. In 
addition to these five main macro indicators, van Donselaar defines incidental factors as 
the leading indicator for used aircraft values. The Asian economic crisis had such an 
incident that the over capacity in the region resulted in airlines to dispose surplus 
capacity. An increased supply of wide-body aircraft was expected to result in prices to 
drop. Interest/inflation rates were not found to be leading indicators because no 
significant correlation to aircraft values was found (van Donselaar, 1998). As meso-
economic indicators van Donselaar lists old and new technology, oil price, narrow and 
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(4 ) 
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wide-body aircraft, regulation and deregulation and noise legislation. According to his 
analysis, oil price has a 20 to 40% share of operating cost, which makes it the leading 
meso-economic indicator. Noise legislation ranks second and regulations rank third in 
degree of importance. Aircraft size and age of technology are not found to be meso-
economic indicators for aircraft values. 
For the third category, micro economic indicators for aircraft values, van 
Donselaar found four factors. While the meso-indicators were related to the aircraft 
model, three micro indicators determine the value of one specific aircraft. The aircraft's 
age and newness is defined as the first leading indicator. The second group of micro-
indicators include the aircraft's physical condition, its maintenance status and 
maintenance documentation. Of these factors, only documentation has leading character. 
Operational flexibility and modification ability form the third group of factors which are 
ranked as the leading indicators. Aircraft acceptance is micro-indicator number four, but 
it refers to a specific aircraft as well as the aircraft type. Acceptance of an aircraft type 
depends on its stigma, and hard- and soft factors. The hard factors are the operator base 
and the total number of aircrafts built and in service. Soft factors are early availability, 
family concept and image of other customers. An aircraft's stigma depends on special 
situations such as operating conditions, repairs or an aircraft type's reputation in regard to 
safety. All four micro-indicator groups are considered important. 
The macro-economic indicators are extremely important because they are 
indicators of the aviation industries cycles, which have the most impact on aircraft 
values. The micro-indicators "only" determine the exact value of a specific aircraft in 
regard to the timing of the industry cycle. 
34 
Empirical Valuation Models: How Useful Have They Been? (Karathanassis, 1983): 
Research conducted about aircraft valuation is very limited. Therefore, literature 
regarding asset valuation theory is examined in this chapter. One of the most common 
forms of valuation is share valuation. The concept of investing in any asset is the same 
since the investors expect a return on their investment. Karathanassis believes that share 
valuation models are not properly specified by researchers. The share value in statistical 
models is generally based on a combination of the following factors: dividends, retained 
earnings, growth, risk gearing and size. Karathanassis is concerned about the practical 
applicability of the valuation theory since theorists make a lot of fundamental 
assumptions. Share values are defined as a function of expected perpetual benefits. 
Algebraically, the market price can be expressed as: 
e e e 
p = — = r + T + ...+ k (i+k)' o+k)' (i+k)" ( 5 ) 
where p is the unobserved expected value of earnings per share and k is the marginal 
discount rate. The price of a growth share is expressed as: 
e be 
p=- + — y
 k k 
r-k 
( 6 ) 
where b is a constant retention ratio and r is the rate of return on new assets. The 
predominant opinion among financial experts is that the share price is determined by 
dividends and not by earnings. The formula for the share price using dividends is: 
( 7 ) 
Karathanassis claims that Equation 6 and 7 have never been tested by researchers 
and that it is not proven whether the dividends hypothesis or earnings hypothesis is more 
valid. He concludes that economic and statistical models were badly specified and thus 
these empirical models are not very valuable. 
The Relationship between Investment and Asset life (Prezas, 1994): 
Prezas describes a model, which shows that optimal investment and optimal asset 
life are interdependent through operating cash flows and depreciation allowance, as well 
as book and salvage values up to termination. In contradiction to existing literature, 
Prezas shows that optimal investment and asset life are determined simultaneously. 
Other models use a predetermined investment in order to find the optimal asset life or a 
predetermined asset life in order to optimize the investment. In both variations Prezas 
claims that exogenously fixed factors result in NPV's to be not maximized. Only the 
simultaneous consideration of investment and asset life leads to a project's maximum 
NPV and asset value. If an extension of the holding period increases the benefits of 
marginal investment, asset life and investment are positively related. According to Myers 
and Majd, a firm has the option to change the duration of asset life in the event of future 
cash flows and salvage values deviating from previous expectations. If the over capacity 
of the early nineties could have been foreseen, project termination could have resulted in 
1-b j be 
- + — 
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higher returns than continuation at low operating cash flows during the recession. 
Optimal investment and asset life increases with the use of riskless debt because benefits 
of marginal investment increase and cash flows generated by asset termination become 
reduced. 
Prezas' model is based on the equation 8 where V reflects "the asset's NPV of 
unleveraged after-tax future cash flows (including depreciation tax shields), plus the 
present value of the after-tax salvage value (including book value tax shields), less the 
assets initial cost. 
V(I, T\ U a,r) = ([(1 - T)X(I, t) + rD{a91, T)] eU dt 
-u 
+ {5(7, T) - r[(S(I, T) - B{a, /, T)]}e-I ( 8 ) 
I = Investment 
L = market value leverage ratio 
t = time of asset's life 
T = corporate tax rate 
r = unlevered cash flow 
D = cost of debt 
k = required rate of return = k = r-xrDL 
cost of per unit of investment = 1 
X(I,t) = unleveraged operating cash flow 
T = abandonment time 
D(a,I,t) = depreciation allowance at time t 
B(ot,I,t) = asset's book value 
S(I,T) = salvage value 
ot= holding time 
From the first order conditions of this function Prezas finds the optimal values for 
investment (I) and abandonment time (T), maximizing the assets value. 
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"Free Cash Flow" Appraisal. . A better way? (Brown, 1996): 
There has been more research conducted about real estate appraisal than about 
aircraft appraisal. For that reason, Gordon T. Brown's paper concerned with cash flow 
analysis in real estate appraisals, is included in the literature review. Brown criticizes the 
traditional way of net operating income capitalization for a given property in order to find 
the market value. He recommends an increased application of the traditional income 
approach. Free cash flows should be defined and thoroughly examined in order to 
produce quality income property appraisals. Insufficient attention has been paid to the 
cash flow itself. Often the final earnings are measured instead of defining the direction 
and amount of cash funds. Cash flow statements reveal the exact operating, investing and 
financing activities related to a real estate enterprise. "Free cash flows are cash flows 
generated by the current operation of a business or real estate venture and are available to 
be distributed back to the owners/shareholders without affecting current levels of growth. 
The purpose of free cash flow analysis is to determine the condition of the enterprise, 
after extraneous items, non-repetitive items, and accounting variations are removed. By 
applying the free cash flow analysis discretionary and non-discretionary activities and 
expenditures for each of the operating, investing and financing categories, can be 
identified. By quantifying the cash impact the underlying earning power of a single real 
estate asset can be determined. The net operating income can be misleading as revenues, 
expenditures, assets or liabilities might not be fully included, or have only little 
relationship to the enterprise. A further objective of free cash flow analysis is to find the 
optimal balance debt and equity financing for the real estate venture. The volatility of 
historical free cash flows should be measured in order to predict if free cash might be 
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needed to cover operating or investing activities. While the free cash flow method is only 
a theory, the accuracy is expected to be much higher than those of traditional cash flow 
appraisals. 'Tree cash flow analysis allows the examiner to take a critical look at the 
current level and at the future direction of those cash flows both in terms of quantity and 
quality" (Brown, 1996). 
Capital Asset Valuation for Stochastically Deteriorating Equipment (Jones, 1992): 
Jones, P., Hopp and W., Zydiak, J (JHZ) have developed a capital asset valuation 
theory for stochastically deteriorating equipment that provides the asset's economic value. 
Traditionally, capital asset valuation theory is based on two assumptions: Equipment 
deteriorates deterministically and there is an active secondary market (resale) for the 
equipment. JHZ's model is developed for stochastically deteriorating equipment for 
which there is no active secondary market. The model seems interesting for the 
discussion of aircraft values, since the secondary market for aircrafts are not transparent 
and depreciation patterns are not exactly known either. According to the user-cost theory, 
value of durables is derived from the services they provide, not from the durables 
themselves. Jorgenson and Johnson found that user-cost theory provides an explanation 
for empirically observed demand for durables and that it can be applied to define 
economic depreciation. Stochastic deterioration has the advantage that it accurately 
models real systems. Brealey and Myers observed that the market for many corporate 
assets are too thin to derive economic value from the market prices. The same is true for 
aircraft values where there is not sufficient information about resale prices available. 
The model is based on the following equations: 
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n 
£ P C ( < 7
'
, =
 l-&r,<0*«.0 (9 ) 
EPC = expected present cost of operating a machine in state i and operating it until it is 
replaced according to replacement policy aT; 
7i(i,j) = probability that a machine is in state i that is kept in any year will be in state j in 
the following year; 
GT = replacement policy; 
lsl = salvage value of a machine in state i; 
mx = opportunity cost (including maintenance, operating and obsolesce) of keeping a 
machine in state i; 
6 = l/(l+r), where r is the effective annual interest rate (8 is called the discount factor) 
x = state of the machine; 
a,ic7r)=
 i-&7r('><«,0 ( 1 0 ) 
ai(<xc)= expected present cost of cash flow stream; 
. p.+EPCW 
yz (ffr) ;—; 
CCSCFJ ( l i ) 
y*x(ax) = amortized annual cost of the machine over the expected replacement cycle; 
y * { i ] = i ? /• ^ 
1-071(1,1) 
y** = economic value of capital asset subject to stochastic deterioration; 
"Since y* is the expected annual equivalent cost of operating a machine over its expected 
replacement cycle, y* is the expected marginal cost of owning a machine in an arbitrary 
state i. For a firm that maximizes expected profits, expected marginal revenue is equal to 
marginal cost. Therefore, y* is the expected value of services provided by a machine in 
state i" 
Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? (Pulvino, 1998): 
Pulvino examines the impact of capital constraints on aircraft liquidation prices. 
Using Avmark's 1978 to 1991 transaction data for narrow-body jet aircraft, he determines 
the magnitude of discounts at which distressed airlines liquidate assets. After 1991, the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) did not require airlines to report transaction prices 
anymore. Subsequently to 1991, only voluntary disclosed information is available, 
transactions after 1991 were excluded from the analysis. Data on U.S. airlines were 
obtained from Compustat, company lOKs and lOQs, Moody's Transportation Manual, Air 
Carrier Statistics and the Capital Changes reporter. Hedonic regression was employed in 
order to analyze the data. Pulvino had problems finding the present net value of cash 
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flows generated by the asset, which he called the fundamental value. "Empirical efforts 
to measure discounts at which assets are liquidated are complicated by the inability to 
measure fundamental values." The Schleifer and Vishny industry-equilibrium model of 
asset liquidation was also applied to the analysis. The model shows that discounts are 
high in depressed industries where the asset is very industry specific. During an industry 
wide recession, the market for industry specific assets is not liquid. In the airline industry 
the consequence would be that the demand for an aircraft with discounts so low, non-
industry financiers become interested in the assets. Outsiders are not highest-value users, 
such as operators, and therefore they require higher discounts in order to compensate for 
the risk associated with finding a lessee. Pulvino found that during recessions, financial 
institutions are able to negotiate discounts of 30% compared to the average market price. 
Financially distressed airlines or airlines with low spare debt capacities need to offer a 
14% discount to the average market price in order to stimulate demand. Findings of 
Pulvino also have implications for firms' capital structure decisions. Maintaining spare 
debt capacity for recessions may result in opportunities to acquire additional capacity at 
bargaining prices from industry fire sales. 
42 
2.4 Supply and demand of aircraft 
Introduction 
The price for any good in a free market is generally determined as a function of 
supply and demand, thus both factors will be discussed for the civilian aircraft market. 
While aircraft manufacturers comprise the supply side of the equation, airlines and 
leasing companies comprise the demand side. There exist many buyers in the market for 
large commercial aircraft, aircraft greater than 100 seats, but only two suppliers. As a 
result of consolidation and companies leaving the market, today there is only the 
European Airbus consortium competing head on with the Seattle based Boeing Company. 
Thus the supply side of new aircraft is characterized as a duopoly. After an explanation 
of the aircraft manufacturing industry's characteristic, an overview of the consolidation 
process and the history of the different international manufacturers in the industry will be 
given. 
One important aspect in the Aerospace Industry is the total number of units one 
can produce annually. These annual unit volume shipments are relatively low compared 
to most manufacturing industries. As can be seen from Figure 9, the number of aircraft 
delivered worldwide peaked in 1991 and 1998 and did not surpass the 800 units ceiling. 
This low volume of production makes the automation of many manufacturing processes 
prohibitively expensive. 
Civil Jet Aircraft Deliveries (>100 seats) 
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J L l ^ 
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Figure 9. Commercial Jet Aircraft Deliveries. 
The dominant producer of commercial jet aircraft is Boeing, who delivered an all 
time high of 563 aircraft in 1998. Still, economies of scale and automation options are 
very limited as each customer is ordering a highly customized product. The Industry 
assembles high-tech products but its assembly processes are fairly labor intensive, with 
relatively little reliance on high-tech production techniques. Assembling a highly 
customized product requires a massive labor force for production. The percentage of the 
Industry's workforce involved in craft and technical occupations is significantly higher 
than for manufacturing in general. Maintaining enough qualified employees in these 
positions is one of the Industry's chief challenges. Cyclical swings in airline demand 
dictate that the manufacturer's workforce needs to be periodically adjusted. 
The cost of launching an all-new aircraft program today is higher than $5 billion. 
Generally, the break even point lies between 400 and 600 units which results in negative 
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cash flows of each program for about 7 to 10 years (McGuire, 1997). The development 
costs for Airbus' A3XX are expected to accumulate up to $10 billion. 
The aerospace industry can have a positive impact on a nation's economy. This 
can be illustrated by examining the industry's impact to the United State's economy. 
Aerospace exports worth $19.7 billion in 1986 represented 9.6% of total US exports. 
While in 1990, the industry contributed about $27 billion to the US trade balance, in 1996 
exports of aerospace vehicles and equipment topped $37.4 billion with a positive trend. 
Thus, aerospace sales represented 16.7% of the total 1996-export value of $625.1 billion 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 1998). 
The aerospace industry structure can be summarized by the following four 
industry characteristics: huge capital requirements, high technology know-how 
requirements, high labor intensity and cyclical demand. Overall there exists high barriers 
to enter the commercial aircraft manufacturing market. 
2.4.1 Supply 
The World wide structure of the commercial aircraft manufacturing Industry: 
Asia: 
Asian and Pacific Rim nations account for 20% of the world market for 
commercial aircraft. Despite the recent Asian economic crises, this market is expected to 
have the highest growth rates in the future while North America and European markets 
approach maturity levels. Due to the Asian economic crisis, defense and civilian 
aerospace budgets have become slashed, and a thinning out of the industry has become 
apparent (Handley, 1998). In South Korea the Government ordered the merger of the 
four aerospace companies: Samsung Aerospace Industries, Korean Air, Daewoo Heavy 
Industries and Hyundai Space and Aircraft Co. Most programs, such as the F-16 program 
depend heavily on government support (Handley, 1998). Plans for a civilian 100 seater 
are also canceled. 
In Indonesia, Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN) is suffering from less 
government support, too. There is some interest in the 60 to 80 seat N-250's but IPTN is 
in severe financial trouble (Handley, 1998). The capital required for the development of 
the 80 to 130 seat jet, the N-2130, is expected to fail due to financing problems (Handley, 
1998). 
Because of the Japanese defense budget reduction, 9% in 1998, the aerospace 
industry is focusing more on civilian products, which reached 45% of revenues. While 
the Japanese produce the F-2 jet fighter, they do not currently plan to build commercial 
jet aircraft by themselves (Handley, 1998). The Society of Japanese Aerospace 
Companies (SJAC) announced $8.3 billion revenues for 1998. Japanese aerospace 
suppliers provide 20% of parts and components for Boeing's B777 program. They are 
also suppliers for the B767 and the International Aero Engines V2500 programs 
(Handley, 1998). 
Chinese Aerospace companies have been assembling trunkliners under license 
from McDonnell Douglas, but currently, they are mainly working as suppliers for Boeing 
or Airbus. In Shanghai, the Chinese assembled 28 MD-80 aircraft under license of 
McDonnell Douglas (Wells, 1999). The 100 seater A3 IX that was supposed to be 
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manufactured in a joint venture of Airbus and Aviation industries of China (AVIC) failed 
because of discords regarding the know-how transfer and the work distribution of the 
project. Officially there does not exist enough demand in the 100 seater market. 
Singapore Technologies Aerospace also had ambitions to develop a mid-sized passenger 
jet in a joint venture with China, but the plan so far remains a "paper concept" (Handley, 
1998). 
Taiwan's main aerospace manufacturer, Aerospace Industrial Development 
Corporation (AIDC) is one of the few aerospace companies being privatized. AIDC is 
supposed to keep its role as a supplier and provider of aircraft services. 
Russia/CIS: 
In Russia there exist about 335 enterprises and organizations which represent 
about 80% of the former Soviet Union 's aircraft industry. The 19 large production plants 
and design bureaus have a capacity of manufacturing about 350 fixed wig aircraft and 300 
helicopters per year (Butowski, 1998). In 1998 a total of only 45 aircraft has been 
assembled (Butowski 1998). Besides the military aircraft SU-27 and SU 30, which are 
exported to China, Vietnam and Irkutsk, there is no upturn expected to materialize for the 
Russian aerospace industry. According to the ministry of economy, the aerospace 
industry is going to be transformed into five or six conglomerates designing and 
manufacturing aircraft (Butowski, 1998). 
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United States: 
The US aerospace industry's dominant role was established through a very 
positive environment. The main aircraft manufacturers Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and 
Lockheed were engaged in both civilian and military products. The development of new 
civilian products or the transformation of military in commercial aircraft was supported 
by a steady flow of governmental research and development money. Boeing's first 
successful jetliner, the B707 resulted from an evolution of the KC-135 tanker, contracted 
by the Pentagon. Boeings foundations for today's global supremacy in the commercial 
aircraft market was laid in the 1950's, when the Seattle corporation secured a string of 
4,422 military orders from the Pentagon. In 1996, the Department of Defense (DOD) and 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) sales accounted for $50.6 
billion, or 45% of aerospace sales (Wells, 1999). 
Operating in the most developed and largest single aviation air transport market, 
the US airline industry assisted the manufacturers by acting as reliable and eager launch 
customer for new aircraft. With an initial down payment for several planes from the 
airlines the manufacturers could underwrite the expenses for the capital intensive 
projects. Another success factor of American aerospace companies was their motivation 
to strive continuously for innovative products despite the high financial risks involved. 
Boeing for example, risked the whole company when developing the B747 in the 1960's 
and spending $2 billion on the project, which was 212 times the value of the firm 
(Anonymous, 1999). Until 2005 when Airbus intends to deliver its first A3XX, a 550 to 
650 seater, the B747 will be unchallenged in the 400 plus seat market. Lockheed 
developed the LI 011 in the late 60's, a tri-jet with 250 to 400 seats capacity, but never 
earned money during the project life, from 1971 to 1982. The main reason for the failure 
of the product was that at the same time, MCD brought the DC-10, an aircraft with very 
similar technical characteristics as the L-1011, to the market. The demand for two nearly 
identical products was to low, so Lockheed never reached its break-even point. After 
Lockheed decided to focus on its military products, there was only MCD and Boeing left 
in the US civil aerospace industry. In 1997, Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas 
making it an aerospace conglomerate with 238,000 employees by 1998 (Barie, 1998). 
Table 5 exhibits Boeing's and former McDonnell Douglas' numbers of orders and 
deliveries by aircraft type (Boeing, 1999). 
Table 5 
Boeing Commercial Jet Orders and Deliveries as of April 30, 1999 
Model 
707 
717 
727 
737 
747 
757 
767 
111 
DC10 
DC8 
DC9 
MD11 
MD80 
MD90 
i Totals: 
j Orders 
1.010 
115 
1.831 
4.264 
1.293 
966 
865 
418 
446 
556 
976 
200 
1.191 
134 
14,265 
Deliveries 
1,010 
0 
1,831 
3,361 
1,208 
859 
746 
208 
446 
556 
976 
187 
1,167 
104 
12,659 
Source. Boeing 1998 
http7/www.boeing com/commercial/orders/index html 
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For 1998, Boeing reported 656 firm orders, valued $42 billion at list prices (Goldsmith, 
1999). In 1999, Boeing's deliveries are expected to rise from 563 in 1998 to 620. Due to 
a weaker demand for wide-bodies, caused mainly by the Asian economic crises, Boeing 
announced a cutback in production rates for the B747 and B777 (Figure 10). A cutback 
from 5 to 2 B747's and from 7 to 5 B777's per month at the end of 1999 might not be 
enough according to an independent market analysis (Goldsmith, 1999). Boeing is 
phasing out all its commercial McDonnell Douglas (MCD) products beside the MD-95 
program called B717 now. 
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30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
Boeing -1999 Monthly Production Rates 
D 1st qtr • 2nd qtr • 3rd qtr • 4th qtr 
nn 
IT 
n-Hnii • II 1 • ll 1 111 1 • 1 
737 737 NG 747 757 767 777 MD-80/90 MD-11 
Classic 
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Figure 10. Boeing's Monthly Production Rates. 
With just over 100 seats, the B717 rounds up Boeings product spectrum in the narrow-
body twin-jet market. New Generation B737 (NG) derivatives have a seating capacity for 
110 to 189 passengers. The B757, also a narrow-body jet, can be configured from 185 to 
243 seats. The B767 series consists of two-aisle twinjets with a capacity of 200 to 304 
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seats. The two B777 models offer space for 316 to 479 passengers. Boeing's only jet, 
powered by more then two engines is the B747-400, which is the only aircraft able to 
transport more than 500 passengers (420 to 568 seats) (First Equity, 1999). Currently 
Boeing is exploring an altered design of the B747-400 that would increase the Aircraft's 
capacity from 416 to 510 seats in a three class layout, while the range would be increased 
to 7,800 nm (Cole, 1999). 
After experiencing severe problems when increasing production rates in 1997 and 
1998, mainly caused by bottlenecks in the supply chain, Boeing posted its' first loss in 
fifty years. Despite a huge backlog, Chairman Phil Condit conceded that for 1999 and 
2000 profit margins for commercial airplanes will remain under two percent. 
Figure 11 shows the 1998 List prices for Boeing's Narrow-body and Wide-body 
jets (Greenslet, 1998). 
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Europe: 
In Europe, the main aerospace industries consolidated during the past decades. 
Besides Airbus (Figure 12), only the Dutch aircraft manufacturer Fokker Aircraft BV sold 
civil jet aircraft. Since 1988, Fokker delivered 278 FlOO's, a 100 seat and 40 F70's which 
accommodates 70 to passengers. After Fokker went out of business in 1998, besides 
Airbus, there exist only regional civil aircraft manufacturers in Europe. 
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Figure 12. Airbus Partners. 
The aerospace division of Saab (Saab 340/2000) in Sweden announced in 1998 
that it would terminate its production of turboprop aircraft. The Gemian manufacturer of 
regional aircraft, Dornier, merged with the American Fairchild and started to produce 
regional jets (328JET). British Aerospace, French Aerospitale and Italian Alenia formed 
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the joint venture Aero International Regional (AIR), based in France. AIR sells the Avro 
jet and the ATR42/72 turboprop family. 
In July 1967 France, Germany and Great Britain agreed to support the Airbus 
A300 program. In December 1970 the Airbus Industrie consortium was established. The 
Airbus Consortium was formed as a Groupement d'Interet Economique (GIE). Under the 
French legislation, all GIE partners are operating individually while sharing economic 
interests. While Aerospitale of France, and Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace Airbus GmbH 
of Germany, each have a 37.9% share, British Aerospace holds 20%, and Spain's CASA 
has a 4.2% share. These four partners are responsible for most of the design and all 
aircraft manufacture work. Airbus Industrie itself only manages and coordinates 
production and sales. So far the members are joint as a GIE but the long-term goal is to 
transform the consortium into a private corporate entity (Casamayou, 1999). Despite the 
delivery of 229 aircraft for a total of $13.3 billion in revenue, Airbus Industrie announced 
a loss of $200 million for 1998. With the addition of the 107 seater A318, to the A319, 
A320, A321 twinjet family, Airbus will serve the short-haul market with 100 to 185 seats. 
The medium range twinjet wide-bodies, A310 and A300, accommodate 210 to 251 
passengers respectively. In the long-haul group, the A330 twinjet derivatives have a 
capacity to carry 253 to 295 passengers in three class layouts. Powered by four engines, 
the A340 family has a capacity of 239 to 380 seats in a three-class layout. Both, the A330 
and A340 can be configured with a maximum of 440 seats. The list prices for these 
models are shown in Figure 13. 
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While in the early 80's, Airbus' market-share was 15%, the goal of 50% was 
nearly reached in 1998. In that year, the European consortium received 556 firm orders 
worth $39 billion (Variey, 1999). For 1999, Airbus plans to deliver 295 aircraft; 222 of 
those will be narrow-bodies. The production rates will be increased in 2000 so that 317 
aircraft, including 239 narrow-bodies, will be assembled. In the long run, the European 
consortium aims for 350 deliveries per annum (Saraco, 1999). While not launched yet, 
the A3XX, a jetliner with two passenger decks for the full length of the fuselage is 
scheduled to enter service in 2005 (van der Walt, 1999). In a three-class configuration, 
the new aircraft will accommodate 555 passengers. The new price for an A3XX will be 
between $180 and $200 million. Critics argue that there is not enough demand for such 
an aircraft to recover development costs, and that it will be hard for airlines to generate 
enough revenue on price elastic longhaul routes to earn a sufficient return on such a high 
investment (Holloway, 1999). 
2.4.2 Demand 
Demand for new aircraft is determined by two factors. One factor is the airlines' 
expectations of traffic growth and their need for additional capacity. The second factor is 
the need for replacement of old aircraft. Old aircraft become either uneconomical to be 
operated or prohibited to be operated by environmental legislation. 
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Figure 14. World-Wide Aircraft and Airline Distribution. 
Excluding the CIS states, in 1998 the 217 world major airlines were operating 
9677 aircraft with more than 70 seats. The distribution of these aircraft can be seen in 
Figure 14. The biggest two markets are North America and Europe, followed closely by 
the Asia-Pacific Region (Boeing 1999). 
Two trends are characterizing the Airline industry at the end of the 20th century. 
Number one is a continuously growing popularity of the hub and spoke system. Today 
hubbing is used by nearly every airline in order to rationalize route networks and improve 
the quality of service, since even small communities can be served economically at 
reasonable fares. The second trend is consolidation and the formation of international 
strategic alliances. 
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Figure 15. Alliances Market-share. 
Currently just four major global alliances are carrying about 60% of all world 
passengers (Figure 15). The three main reasons for the airline industry to form alliances 
are to provide the customer with one global route network, seamless travel and to increase 
profits. Profits can be increased due to the fact of increased economies of scope, density 
and scale and common resource allocation while simultaneously the extended network 
and frequencies can stimulate demand and result finally in higher load-factors (Feldman, 
1998). It is expected that alliance partners will also seek to exploit their combined buying 
power by rationalizing their purchases of goods and services and of aircraft. As a result 
there might develop oligopoly concentration on the aircraft demand side similar to that on 
the supply side. Delta, Singapore Airlines and Swissair for example set up a joint 
purchasing operation in 1996. As part of its Mercurious program KLM purchased aircraft 
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in bulk with some of its partners. Another example is the joint purchase of A330 by 
Swissair, Austrian and Sabena (Holloway, 1998). 
Besides operating in an healthy economic environment and exploiting the 
advantages of liberalization and alliances, the development of highly sophisticated yield 
management systems contributed highly to the success of most airlines in the late 90's. 
Revenues and load factors increased after the recession at the beginning of this decade 
(Figure 16 and Figure 18, Boeing, 1999). Despite high profits during cyclical upturns, 
overall industry earnings have been poor (Holloway, 1998). 
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Figure 16. Historic Load-Factors by Region. 
Increased competition resulted in higher productivity but also in generally 
decreasing yields (Figure 17). 
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Figure 17. History of Passenger- and Cargo-Yields. 
The cyclical growth of the industry is explained by two factors. One is the 
sensitivity of demand to fluctuations in the economic environment, the business cycle. 
The second factor is the lead-time for new aircraft. In the past airlines ordered too many 
aircraft during boom periods and needed to take delivery when the demand slowed down. 
The result was an increase in capacity in an already saturated market (Holloway, 1998). 
Figure 18 exhibits how the order backlog decreases only slowly during downturns. 
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Figure 18. Net Order Volume and Operating Profit. 
As a result of over capacity yields dropped and at the low operating margins 
prevalent in the industry, operating cost for most airlines were higher than revenues. 
During 1990 and 1993 industry wide net losses accumulated to more than $15 billion 
(Holloway, 1998). 
Since many carriers became privatized or more financially accountable during the 
1990's, airline decisions are now driven more by commercial other than political concepts 
(Holloway, 1998). Airlines are now more concerned with life cycle costs. Manufacturers 
need to prove that new technology offers cost or revenue advantages. The airlines use the 
revenue-earning potential as a reference to value, not the manufacturers cost-plus formula 
(Holloway, 1998). British Airways for example is requiring a significant reduction in 
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seat-mile cost compared to the B747-400 for the A3XX, in order to be interested in the 
new aircraft (Woolsey, 1998). 
The demand for commercial jet aircraft with more that 70 seats predicted by 
Boeing and Airbus is similar. For the next 20 years both manufacturer predict traffic to 
grow by five percent. As a result Airbus foresees demand for 13,600 new aircraft while 
Boeing foresees demand for 17,300 new aircraft. On average, these numbers reflect 
annual deliveries of 680 and 865 aircraft respectively. Boeing predicts the composition of 
the world fleet to be 71% single-aisle airplanes, 22% intermediate-size airplanes and 7% 
747-size or larger airplanes. Figure 19 shows that the total value of single-aisle aircraft is 
relatively low compared to the 70% share of total deliveries. This explains the 
importance of wide-body orders for the manufacturers. 
Number of aircraft 
Inter-
mediate 
twin-aisle 
25% 
Boeing 10 year 
forecast 
Value of aircraft 
Inter-
mediate 
twin-aisle 
44% 
Boeing, 1999 - http://wvvvv.boeing.com/commercial/cmo/index.html 
Figure 19. Comparison of Aircraft Values and Units Produced. 
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Leasing Industry: 
Commercial aircraft leasing has strong growth rates, as airlines look for 
alternative means of financing. Since deregulation in 1978, the aircraft has not only 
grown in size but also in variety of services offered by aircraft financiers. Technological 
advancement as well as rising safety standards caused capital expenditures to rise. 
"'Airlines can now juggle investment options by managing their assets through mixing 
finance formulae which use traditional loans as well as finance leasing and operating 
leasing" (Wagland, 1999). It is estimated that about 25% of the 1999 airline fleet is 
operating under operating lease agreements. While in 1992, 50% of aircraft were owned 
by the airlines, this number decreased to 40% in 1995. Then, 37% of the world airline 
fleet was financed by finance lease agreements and 23% under operating lese agreements 
(Wagland, 1999). The future of the leasing industry is characterized by the airlines desire 
to increase financial flexibility, benefits of tax advantages, and limit risk. Table 6 
summarizes the reasons for increased popularity of aircraft leasing (Holden, 1998). 
Table 6 
Drivers of Leasing Popularity: 
Airline Privatization focusing attention on Balance Sheets 
Competition increases need for Flexibility and Quick Response to Market Opportunities 
Low Rates of New Aircraft Price Escalation reduces Economic Attraction of Ownership 
Long Term Fleet Mix difficult to predict as Markets and Products Change 
Leasing no longer seen as The Expansive Solution of Last Resort but rather as One 
Component of Overall Financing 
Summary: 
With a monopoly in the 400 plus seat market and access to a much bigger customer base 
than Airbus, Boeing is ranked as the number one aircraft manufacturer. With revenues 
approximately four times as high as Airbus', and a wider product range which includes 
military and space products, Boeing will most likely keep its leading position in the 
industry (Holloway, 1998). By implementing a common management information system 
and by restructuring the organization, Boeing is trying to prevent the problems 
experienced in the late 90's from happening again. While fighting for market-share, the 
challenge for both manufacturers is to "find ways to continually improve their ability to 
flexibly expand and contract production capacity to meet the needs of a very cyclical 
business" (McClehanen, 1998). 
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On the demand side, the manufacturers predict a healthy growth, but the danger of 
over capacity needs to be recognized since lead times become reduced only in little 
increments. Analysts believe that the high production rates will not be reduced early 
enough in order to prevent capacity from outgrowing seat demand (Velocci, 1998). 
Despite a continuing Asian Crisis, airlines did not reduce their orders significantly. The 
airline industry remains optimistic that the traffic growth will be sufficient to fill all the 
new sets added to their fleets. 
In 1998 about 200 aircraft were retired. Increasing retirements for the next five 
years seem likely as nearly 2,500 aircraft will reach 30 years of age or older. (CL/PK, 
1998). Traffic growth was about 6% to 8% annually since 1996 and is expected to 
continue in this range. For 1999 and 2000 up to 1,000 aircraft will be delivered per year. 
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3 Aircraft appraising 
3.1 Why is it important to forecast aircraft values? 
Future value forecasting is important: 
> For airlines when they make investment decisions to buy aircraft 
> For non-airline Investors such as lessors 
> For financiers if the Investor defaults and the aircraft functions as collateral 
> Leasing industry 
The need for accurate aircraft value forecast emerged particularly with the growing 
leasing industry and the operating lease boom during the 1980's. Between 1986 and 1996 
the number of airlines leasing all their fleet increased by 465% to 214. In 1998 about 
23% of the world's commercial fleet is operated under similar operating lease agreements 
(Holden, 1998). The spreading inability of second tier airlines to finance directly the 
aircraft needed to accommodate growth and replacement and flag carrier7s need for 
flexibility will result in further expansions of the leasing market (Wells, 1993). Besides 
differences between national leasing laws, the industry distinguishes mainly between 
financial and operational leases. The airline industry uses different financial tools in 
order to expand or renew their capital-intensive fleets. Besides buying aircraft with 
internally generated funds, airlines often choose between different lending respectively 
leasing possibilities. 
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Asset based financing: 
If a loan or a financial lease is asset based, the amortization of principal debt 
outstanding is planned to be always lower than the expected aircraft value. The asset 
based financing is also known as non-title based financing. It includes generally a first 
priority mortgage over the aircraft being financed, a security assignment over the lease 
payments if the borrower leases out the aircraft to an operator, and other protections and 
assignments of aircraft liability insurances. First priority mortgages need to be defined 
carefully because of accessibility of the aircraft and ensuring priority over any local 
charges, costs and related liens. In the case of an obligors default the lender has to realize 
the value of the aircraft in order to be cured in full. To evaluate the risk the lender is 
exposed to, he needs to know the expected future value of the aircraft. The more accurate 
the aircraft's value can be predicted the higher the confidence and the lower the risk for 
the lender. The younger and the more popular an airframe engine combination along with 
the higher the market penetration, the easier it is to re-market the aircraft. Also, the 
steadier the value of the asset is. However, the market conditions are mainly determined 
by the imbalance of the demand and supply of capacity and should be considered along 
with the accuracy anticipated in order to evaluate the aircraft's future value. 
If a loan is obligor-based and a default occurs, the lender is entitled to other 
predetermined sources of capital, for example the proceeds from selling other assets, cash 
collaterals, or letters of credit as the underlying aircraft's value would be too low to 
compensate for the forgone repayments. 
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Finance leases: 
A financial lease is generally the same as an aircraft acquisition financed by a 
secured loan. Similar to a secured loan, the lessee acquires the operational risks and 
rewards of ownership throughout a substantial part of the aircraft's economic life. The 
main difference between purchasing and leasing an aircraft is that with the acquisition of 
the aircraft, the title is transferred directly to the buyer whereas under a financial lease, 
title remains with the lessor or lender. If the aircraft is leased, no substantial advance 
payments are necessary and the acquisition of the aircraft entitles the lessor to take 
advantage of tax shelters. Receiving sufficient rental payments over the life of the lease, 
the lessor recovers the cost of the aircraft plus an additional return on its investment. 
Under a full payout lease, which is typical for financial leases, the lessee amortizes down 
the principal either by sufficient monthly rates or monthly rates with an additional final 
balloon payment. In both cases, the lessee receives title to the aircraft at termination of 
the lease. Sometimes a lease is initially set up as a non full-payout vehicle subsequently 
extended to a full-payout lease. With the transfer of the title, the operator becomes 
exposed to the residual value risk if the aircraft is not technically or economically 
obsolete at the end of the lease period. Depending on the jurisdiction, an airline often is 
not required to keep a leased aircraft on the balance sheet as a liability but as an "asset 
under capital lease" 
Since the long-term lease payments and tax shelters compensate the lessor, he is 
barely exposed to residual asset value risk. As the asset is not the generator of the return, 
the lessor concentrates mainly on the credit rating to evaluate an airline. However, should 
the lessee default, the lessor holds title to the aircraft and is entitled to reimbursement by 
selling or repossessing the asset. To predict and evaluate the risk the lessor is exposed to, 
he needs to know the future values of the underlying aircraft. 
Financial leases are considered long-term vehicles binding the contract partners 
for 10 to 12 years. An exception is with US leveraged leases, which can run for over 20 
years. Despite the longer period of the lease, the payments of finance leases are generally 
lower than those of operating leases. The combination of tax benefits and marginal asset 
risk enables lessors to offer financial leases at favorable terms. 
Being charged lower rentals the lessee also profits from the lessor's tax benefits of 
aircraft ownership. Often deals are closed between lessees and lessors in different tax 
jurisdictions, so that both parties are permitted to depreciate the aircraft for tax purposes. 
As a results the cost of leasing the aircraft can be kept down even more. 
Generally financial leases cannot be canceled, however early termination clauses can 
be attached to the contracts. By paying relatively low penalties in order to compensate 
the lessors for the foregone payments, airlines find financial leases to be vehicles nearly 
as flexible as operating leases. 
Operating leases: 
The operating lease is a non-payout tool, which offers the lessee the opportunity 
of high flexibility regarding the time frame of the lease contract. A medium term lease 
period is considerably shorter than the finance lease and runs usually over 3 to 7 years. 
Whereas the economic life of modern aircraft easily exceeds 25 years, the operating lease 
enables the airline to react promptly to variations in the market. Not only the short lease 
periods but particularly lead times for new aircraft between 9 to 18 month, if production 
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slots are available, make the operating lease attractive for short-term fleet planning 
purposes. Sometimes a sub-leasing option gives the airline additional flexibility. An 
acquisition or finance lease would bind the airline much longer to the asset. As an "off-
balance sheet" item, the operating lease does not influence the airline's leverage. The 
rental payments, which are generally due monthly, are booked as operational expenses in 
contrast to a liability. 
While holding title of the aircraft the lessor is permitted to exploit the tax benefits 
of ownership, but he is also exposed to all the economic risk attributable to aircraft 
ownership. Exposed to the financial and asset value risk due to the long term financial 
commitment of aircraft ownership, the lessor does not receive sufficient payments during 
a single operating lease period to amortize his expenses and, thus, after expiration of a 
lease contract he needs to re-market the aircraft. Selling or re-leasing the aircraft, the 
lessor each time faces new marked conditions determining the return on the next deal. 
New lease payments or the selling price of a returned aircraft depend mainly on the 
demand and supply in the market. High risk involved in this form of short-term lending 
justifies the higher payments for operating leases. To be able to offer sufficient aircraft 
with short lead times an operating lessor needs to order new aircraft well in advance. 
Thereby, he is also exposed to a high risk since he has to predict the number and type of 
aircraft the market will demand in the future. Bulk purchases of aircraft on the one hand 
represent a risk, the lessor is exposed to while on the other hand a lessor can take 
advantage of significant price discounts. For example, ILFC took delivery of 60 new 
aircraft in 1997 In 1996, ILFC took delivery of 15% of Boeings' and Airbus' total 
production (Plueger, 1998). Getting high discounts combined with high credit ratings, 
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which decrease the cost of capital, lessors can provide the airline industry with aircraft at 
reasonable rental payments, even when charging them for the high risk. While the airline 
is not exposed to the residual value risk it forgoes any equity upside opportunity in the 
aircraft future value. Thus, being able to predict future aircraft values accurately, reduces 
the risk and bears an enormous profit potential. 
The re-marketing of aircraft requires special skills from operating lessors. They 
need not only a great deal of financial expertise but also excellent asset knowledge, 
because they must be able to evaluate technical and maintenance conditions of aircraft in 
order to check the compliance of return conditions at the end of each lease. Furthermore, 
they need to process legal knowledge to the multitude of different contracts varying with 
its customers. In regard to future deals and the re-marketing of an aircraft after a lease 
expires an excellent reputation is required in order to augment contacts. As such, an in 
depth understanding of market trends is a major prerequisite for a successful operation. A 
continuing identification of current and future trends in the aviation industry is essential 
to develop traffic and aircraft value forecasts. The cyclical character of the airline 
industry, which will be discussed in detail later, mainly determines the trends in the 
market. 
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3.2 Factors affecting aircraft values 
3.2.1 Economic depreciation 
Similar to other industrial products, an aircraft is depreciating over time. Assets 
depreciate constantly (i.e. straight-line method), if repairs and other operating costs or 
profits, do not vary and the cost of capital rate is negligible (William, 1992). These 
prerequisites are not given in case of an aircraft. There are two reasons responsible for 
the inconsistent depreciation of aircraft. First, an aircraft deteriorates over its years of 
operation, which can sometimes last as long as 25 years. Depending on flight hours and 
landing and take-off cycles, the cost of maintenance and correspondingly the downtime is 
increasing. The aircraft will also loose operational efficiency due to additional drag and 
weight. Second the competition from new aircraft with modern technology, as two men 
cockpits, fly by wire, or more fuel-efficient engines depreciates an aircraft's value faster. 
The increase in direct and relative operating costs reduces the cash flow generating 
capacity of the aging aircraft. Utilization of old aircraft is decreasing not only because of 
longer maintenance downtimes but also because airlines prefer a higher utilization of new 
equipment at lower operating cost. 
Increasing operating costs have a major impact on the theoretical value of an 
aircraft, called base value. The base value defined as Reference Value (RV) at Credit 
Lyonnais/PK Airfinance (CL/PK), represents the net present value of an aircraft's future 
cash flow generating potential. Increasing operating cost and lower utilization reduce the 
net cash flows and thereby the value of aging aircraft. Even though the aircraft's life is 
theoretically not limited, the increasing operating cost will at one point in time exceed the 
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revenue generating capacity and thereby determine the end of the aircraft's economical 
life. From a technical point of view only environmental restrictions or heavy accidents 
lead to aircraft being withdrawn from operation. Thus aircraft often do not only stay in 
service for the 25 years they might have been designed for, but possibly for 30 years, if 
load factors are high enough to generate profits even at higher operating costs compared 
to younger equipment. The following graph (Figure 20) presents the theoretical straight-
line depreciation and the real asymptotic depreciation of aircraft values. 
% of New Price 
Age (Years) 
Source: Hallerstrom 1998 
Figure 20. Aircraft Value Depreciation Patterns. 
The theoretical depreciation is calculated with constant cash flows and a base life 
of about 25 years, resulting in a straight-line depreciation. But in reality, operational cost 
increase at the end of the prime life resulting in declining cash flows after 15-18 years. 
Since most of the aircraft are operated longer than the initially planned 25 years assumed 
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for the straight-line method, the real depreciation line is extended until 30 years. This 
line is descending asymptotically towards zero because the increasing operational costs 
reduce the cash flow generating potential. Despite the increasing operational costs, the 
extension of the economical life over the base-life generates additional revenues. This 
explains why real aircraft values as a percentage of the new price stay higher after passing 
the prime life than the straight-line values. 
The importance of the economic life and of the cash flow generating capacity of the 
aircraft should be understood now. The real depreciation curve or reference value curve 
derived by CL/PK from fitting trend-lines in scatters of historical resale values can be 
expressed as a function of time. The reference value used and developed by CL/PK is 
only a theoretical figure, derived from historical experience and independent of technical 
aircraft data. 
Other models used to predict the base values of aircraft, usually applying aircraft 
specific variables, are much more extensive and complicated. Since a lot of assumptions 
are necessary to predict airline operating cost and revenues the accuracy of these 
techniques needs to be analyzed. Using industry averages bears a high potential of 
uncertainty, since cost structures of airlines are very different and not transparent. Too 
many unknown variables need to be anticipated in order to find the profit generating 
potential over a specific aircraft's economical life. Besides inflation, labor cost, exchange 
rates, load factors, and airfares need to be estimated for one to three decades. Everybody 
must agree that this task bears a very high degree of uncertainty. Looking more 
intensively on only one of the variables, the fuel price (Figure 21), which has a substantial 
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impact on aircrafts' operating costs, we find a high volatility making accurate long-term 
predictions elusive. 
Figure 21. Historical Jet Fuel Cost. 
The following CL/PK formula (Equation 13 and Equation 14) require only two 
variables to be predicted, the prime life and the base life. This is an easier approach to 
calculate the reference value. Since the formula is derived from historical experience, the 
reference value is believed to be more accurate than the cash flow generating approach 
used by most appraisers. 
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fort<tp: RV(t) = RV0(\-—) ( 13 ) 
for t>tp: RV(t)=RV0x(l-^)xeth~'p xe'b"r ( 14) 
hi 
Where RV(t) is the constant dollar reference value at time t, RV0 is the 
average new price of the aircraft, t is the prime life, and tb is the base life. This 
constant dollar reference value (RV) is subsequently grossed up for historical inflation 
and expected future inflation to return the inflation adjusted reference value (LARV). 
This value is the equivalent to the base value representing an aircraft's value in a 
market with demand and supply in equilibrium. The LARV is the foundation used to 
calculate the future values of aircraft by the CL/PK SAFE (Statistical Aircraft 
Financing Evaluation) model, explained in paragraph 4.1.3. In the final analysis, the 
SAFE reference value will be compared to the value resulting from a NPV model 
designed for the B737-300. 
3.2.2 External and internal factors 
The value of an aircraft depends on internal and external factors. External factors 
are not related to the aircraft itself. Since aircraft are traded in one global market, 
political, economical and environmental developments determine the basic market 
conditions. In Figure 22, the summary of aircraft value determinants can be found. 
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AIRCRAFT VALUE DETERMINANTS 
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Figure 22. Internal and External Aircraft Value Determinants. 
The main force driving the airline industry either up or down is the supply and 
demand ratio of seat capacity. The imbalance is created by the following simplified chain 
reaction. Airlines order new aircraft when load-factors are up and the business is 
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prospering. But due to minimum lead times of 12 to 18 months, most airlines take 
delivery of the equipment when the market is already saturated. The additional seat 
capacity results in a surplus of supply and according to general economical rule prices, 
will decline when demand becomes exceeded by supply. Lower yields result in airlines 
retiring old and uneconomical aircraft along with hesitating to invest in new aircraft. 
Finally, the demand for air traffic starts to outgrow the seat capacity. While the industry 
earns big profits, the next down cycle is already launched, since additional capacity will 
be delivered too late again. 
With the growing and decreasing demand for seat capacity the price for aircraft 
also swings up or down. High demand for capacity results in a high demand and high 
prices for used aircraft, since these can be obtained much faster. A further external factor, 
the general economic situation, represented by the world's Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth, is the main factor determining the demand for business and leisure air 
travel. GDP growth combined with the development of more efficient new aircraft, fuel 
price alterations, and environmental regulation lead to changes in airline capacity. High 
fuel prices make newer, more efficient equipment very attractive. Airport and Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) infrastructure constraints might influence demand for bigger aircraft 
because certain routes do not have enough slots available to operate medium sized aircraft 
at high frequencies. As soon as the Stage II ban is implemented, environmental 
regulations will cause more retirement of the older aircraft. Depending on these external 
factors, the values for certain aircraft categories or types deviate more or less from their 
base values. 
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Internal factors are directly related to the aircraft's specifications such as age, size 
and technical status. All three factors have major influence on the aircraft value, but 
depend also on the external factors. For example old wide-bodied aircraft are sought after 
if there is a capacity shortage and fuel cost are not too high. Technological progress 
reducing operating cost of new aircraft in combination with environmental regulations 
and high fuel prices would have dampening effects on the values of old equipment. Old 
aircraft are retired when load-factors are too low to generate revenues higher than 
operating costs. Operating costs mainly determined by fuel consumption, range, seat 
capacity and maintenance necessaries as well as by fees for airports, ATC or insurance 
define in dependence to the market situation the end of an aircraft's economical life. 
Higher operating cost in general result in lower aircraft values. 
Besides type related factors, there are also aircraft specific characteristics 
determining an aircraft's value. Maintenance quality and remaining time toward the next 
major check, cycle and hours an aircraft was utilized along with technical configuration 
are considered in an aircraft specific evaluation process. High quality documented 
maintenance programs and higher specifications as extended range (ER) or extended over 
water operation (ETOPS) can increase the value of an individual aircraft. A low amount 
of flight hours and a high flight hour to cycle ratio, explained in the next chapter, are also 
desirable characteristics in order to achieve high selling proceeds. The longer the time 
before the next major check, which is in general very expensive, is due the higher the 
value. Further subjects to be considered when evaluating aircraft are discussed in the 
following chapters. 
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3.2.3 Cyclical effects 
Air traffic is generally measured in revenue passenger miles (RPM) flown per year. 
Looking at the historical development of RPM growth, the cyclical pattern, which 
characterizes the aviation industry can be found Figure 23. 
trendline 
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Source* Hallerstrom 1998 
Figure 23. Percentage World-Wide Annual Traffic Growth (RPM). 
But why is the traffic growth so volatile? The answer lies in the high correlation 
of air traffic with the world's GDP (van Donselaar, 1998). Since 1970, world GDP 
officially has grown continuously with three recessions slowing down economic 
expansion and resulting in boom and economic slump periods. The slow down in GDP 
growth lead to reduced business travel as well as to reduced leisure travel due to lower 
"actual growth 
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disposable incomes. Simultaneously, the increase of the oil-prices during these 
recessions resulted in higher fares and further reductions of air traffic. 
A small proportion of the RPM growth is explained by generally decreasing fares. 
Airfares were on average declining over the last three decades because the continuing 
trends of international deregulation increased competition. The decline of costs for air 
transportation could be realized because of higher productivity and lately developed 
sophisticated yield management systems. Competition was the main driving force for 
cost reductions. 
A volatile RPM growth requires airlines to constantly adjust their capacity to 
changing market conditions. The airline industry on the one hand needs new aircraft if it 
wants to accommodate traffic growth and on the other hand must retire old equipment in 
case of surplus seat capacity. The difficult task is to foresee the cycles of capacity surplus 
and capacity shortage. To cover the cost of aircraft ownership and operation, airlines 
fleet planning departments must choose aircraft meeting the capacity requirements of 
different routes very accurately in order to ensure high load factors. Without achieving 
high load-factors, airlines can not be profitable. In the short run, airline capacity is fixed 
due to long lead times from the manufacturers. Any capacity expansion has to be planned 
well in advance, because aircraft manufacturers need to design individual production 
schemes for each customer and need to coordinate the supply chains. There are various 
reasons why aircraft production rates are inflexible. The extensive planning, 
manufacturing, and assembling process results in lead times of 10 to 18 month assuming 
open production slots (Velocci, 1996). 
Comparing Figure 23 and Figure 24, the delay in seat growth, resulting from the 
inflexible production rates, relative to traffic growth can be seen. While traffic was down 
in 1991 and 1993, it took the manufacturer two more years to adjust their production rates 
to a minimum level in 1995. According to Figure 23, traffic was increasing already since 
1993. Hence, the creation of the next imbalance was foreseeable. The capacity supply 
and demand imbalance can be explained by the airline's hesitation to order before air-
traffic peaks and the aircraft manufacturer's inflexible production rates. 
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Figure 24. Annual Percentage Capacity Growth (in Seats Worldwide). 
The past has proved that airlines seem to miss the foresight to anticipate market-trends, 
regarding the cycles. In order to adjust for capacity constraints airlines start ordering 
aircraft not before but during traffic peaks. As could already be seen in the late eighties, 
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the continuing trend of traffic growth and high load factors for several years, resulting in 
strong earnings for the whole airline industry was recognized to late. Hesitation to order 
new aircraft in advance lead to a big capacity shortages at the peak of the traffic growth. 
Only then, after earning high profits, airlines ordered new aircraft in order to keep up or 
expand their market-share, believing that traffic will continue to grow. Since new 
equipment was not available in the short run the order backlog grew and simultaneously 
the demand and thereby the values of used aircraft rose. Motivated by big order backlogs 
and fear of loosing market-share both, Boeing and Airbus boosted their production rates. 
While old and new equipment was extensively utilized the delivery of new aircraft 
combined with reductions in traffic growth in the future will probably result in 
diminishing yields for the airlines similar to the painful experience in the early nineties. 
However, it is expected that the decline in traffic caused by the Asian financial crisis will 
be more moderate than the extreme reductions in air traffic during the gulf war. Then the 
combination of declining traffic and the delivery of aircraft ordered during the peak 
resulted in an extreme surplus in capacity and load-factors dropping heavily. On top of 
the reduced revenues airlines suffered from fuel price rising from 1988 to 1991. By 
reducing the fares airlines tried to keep up load factors but they were incapable of 
stopping the revenue streams to decrease. The combination of rising fuel prices and low 
load-factors lead to retirements and parking of old equipment. More than 1,000 aircraft, 
including brand new B747s, representing about 10% of the world's commercial fleet were 
idle (Will they ever fly again, 1992). Because of barely any demand for old aircraft, their 
values dropped deeply especially for wide-bodies. For example, a 1972 delivered DC-10-
30 appraised at $32.5 million in 1991 was traded for $15 million in 1993 (Airclaims, 
83 
1998). After capacity was adjusted and airlines improved their cost structures, the 
industry experienced a boom in the late nineties. In 1997 and 1998 many airlines posted 
record earnings (Flint, 1998). 
It is expected that a new downturn started simultaneous with the Asian Crises in 
1998. Will this downturn have similar disastrous consequences for the airline industry as 
in the early nineties? Comparing the order and delivery ratio could help to answer this 
question. In 1989 orders accumulated to 1600 aircraft up from 600 in 1987. In 1991 
production rates broke the 800 mark, an all time high. As a result of flooding the 
saturated market with surplus capacity, industry's losses exceeded the accumulated 
earnings of many previous years. Despite this experience just recovered from, the 1999 
trends in the aviation industry are very similar to the beginning of the last downturn. In 
1991 Boeing and Airbus delivered 605 and 163 aircraft respectively. For 1999 Boeing 
has planned to boast its production rates to deliver 585 Aircraft. This figure does not 
include a small number of former McDonnell Douglas aircraft types. Combined with an 
estimated output of 260 Airbus aircraft, a total of about 850 aircraft will be delivered in 
1999 (Greenslet, 1998). Boeing has adjusted its production plan already slightly 
downward in order to adjust to the slow down of traffic growth due to the Asian crisis. 
The B747 monthly production rate will be reduced from 5 to 3.5 and the B777 production 
rate will fall from 7 to 5 aircraft per month (Boeing, 1999). While Asia is not believed to 
recover fast it is doubtful that the market can absorb all the new seats. As a consequence 
a new downturn is expected and aircraft values are supposed to fall again. According to 
the Airline Monitor Commercial Aircraft Market Forecast, the capacity surplus peak will 
be 4.5% in 1999. Compared to the 10.1% surplus in 1991 the effect on the market and 
84 
correspondingly on aircraft values should be less critical. But the amount of surplus 
aircraft depends strongly on the number of aircraft to be retired. The introduction of the 
stage II noise emission regulations combined with a lot of aircraft exceeding their 25th 
year of service life could help to significantly reduce surplus capacity. From the year 
1998 to 2000, 348 aircraft per year are expected to be replaced (Plueger, 1998). 
Taking the cumulative difference between the seat growth and the traffic growth 
discussed earlier, the following graph can be received (Figure 25). 
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Figure 25. Capacity Shortage Determined by RPM Growth and Seat Growth. 
The high correlation between the trend adjusted cumulative difference of RPM 
growth and seat growth with values of aircraft shows that the driving force behind aircraft 
values has been found. The amplitude of graph represents the pent-up relative capacity 
shortage (peaks) or surplus (through) called PURCS in the CL/PK SAFE model. 
Characteristics of the PURCS peaks are high utilization of the airline's equipment and 
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high demand for seats i.e. aircraft to expand capacity. High demand and fixed supply 
results in values rising. While production rates are fixed in the short run, over-capacity 
results in decline of aircraft values. To adjust capacity especially older aircraft, which are 
to expensive to be operated at low load factors, become available in the market or retired. 
How strong an aircraft's value is pulled up or down by the PURCS swings is a function of 
the assets age and seat capacity. A young aircraft's operational efficiency combined with 
single aisle seat capacity lead to low cycle sensitivity and vice versa. 
If all the industry knows the impacts of surplus capacity, why is nobody capable 
of preventing capacity to outgrow RPMs? The answer is: Market-share. The 
manufacturers could easily have their production rates swinging at more moderate levels 
and thereby preventing the cost and risk they are exposed to because of aggressively and 
still to slow changing their output. But the main competitors in the commercial aircraft 
market, Boeing and Airbus fear to loose market-share if they do not adopt their 
production rates to the short-term demand. Airbus is announcing that the main goal is to 
reach a 50% market-share. An example of 27% discount to a customer ordering only two 
A330s shows the dedication of the European consortium toward this goal (Aircraft Value 
News, 1998). Of course the manufacturers are considering the long-term relationship to a 
customer as more important than the short-term yields. However, there remains only the 
question if the cost for adopting output and the penalties for not meeting delivery 
deadlines will be compensated by expected future deals. The losses Boeing had in 1997 
and 1998, due to a huge order backlog, show the danger involved in setting the goal too 
high for the production ramp. 
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3.2.4 Cycle volatility reduction 
Can the volatility of demand for aircraft seats be reduced? Keeping demand 
artificial over the production rates the manufacturers could prevent the problems of 
continuous output adjustments. Such a solution is as unrealistic as a totally flexible 
manufacturing system that could be adjusted immediately to the market. The process to 
build such a sophisticated and customized product as a commercial aircraft is too 
extensive to react immediately to market changes. Much more standardization, a shorter 
supply chain and building a stock of standard modular components not very capital 
intensive, or using flexible just in time concepts for expensive parts are solutions to fight 
the cycle dilemma from a manufacturers perspective. Already, manufacturers try to move 
toward this goal. Two trends recognizable are that production rates were increased twice 
as fast as in the last cycle while lead times generally decline (Pluegler, 1998) 
Another alternative to prevent the imbalance between supply and demand, would 
be a more future cycle sensitive ordering policy of the airline industry. But airlines also 
fear to loose market-share if they are not placing orders when the market indicates traffic 
growth. If the whole airline industry would have a better understanding of the cycles, the 
strong volatility could be reduced. Since core air travel demand can be predicted with a 
certainty of ±5%, an airline's fleet should have a 10% flexible component (Skinner, 
1998). This would require innovative leasing and business ideas in order to be more 
responsive to demand. Airlines need to react anti-cyclical when planning their fleets. 
During the upturns aging and inappropriate equipment should be phased out, taking 
advantage of high yields. Short term leases and deferred retirements can be used to build 
up a marginal capacity. The marginal capacity should be reduced with the beginning of 
the down cycle. Then during the trough new equipment should be ordered at favorable 
conditions. Also heavy maintenance should be conducted while the utilization of the 
aircraft is low, thereby the aircraft has a low downtime when traffic is peaking again. If 
the airline is able to predict the cycle it will have big advantages over its competitors and 
also will reduce the cost of capital by proving the strategy to investors. If an airline is 
successfully this way, alliance partner or even competitors might follow the moves and 
thereby reduce the volatility of the cycles. Applying these hypothetical ideas in 
combination with the reduction in lead times, future cycles might become more moderate 
than today's. 
3.2.5 Technical status 
Investors have one thing in common, they all want to get the highest return on their 
investments with the lowest exposure to risk. In contradiction to stocks and derivatives, 
technical products need to be evaluated on their overall technical condition in order to 
find their current and future values. Only then the expected return on the investment can 
be predicted with confidence. Since the most advanced technologies are applied to the 
very complex design of an aircraft, an extensive analysis is required to evaluate the 
technical status. The values of aircraft depend mainly on maintenance quality, the time to 
the next major check, utilization, and the technical configuration. Wear and tear of 
aircraft is not only evaluated on the basis of flight hours but also on the number of cycles. 
A cycle is one take off and landing or in other words one flight. Since the same type of 
aircraft can be operated on different stage length, i.e., routes with different distances, the 
average number of landings per hour can vary. A B737 for example operated in Germany 
solely on domestic routes will have average block times of about 60 minutes. The same 
aircraft type scheduled to the Mediterranean will have an average flight time of 3 hours 
per lag. As a result the aircraft used domestically would have 3 times as much starts and 
landings as the B737 used for the longer legs. While taking off and landing, the aircraft 
must withstand the highest stress. During the touch down and the deceleration the 
undercarriage is exposed to enormous forces. If the thrust reverse is activated after the 
touch down the engines and the wing are also stressed heavily. Even if both aircraft 
would be otherwise exactly the same, the lower hour to cycle ratio of the aircraft flying 
only short lags would reduce the value. 
Maintenance intervals are based on these two measurement units. Each airline 
may have its own maintenance program approved by the country's aviation authority. 
But the manufacturers recommend to use their maintenance-planning document (MPD). 
Typically aircraft checks are called daily, weekly, A, C, or D-check. The Boeing MPD 
for the B737-300 for example assumes an average flight length of 1.4 hours and 8 hours 
utilization per day. Based on these assumptions A-checks and C-checks are due every 
200 and 3200 hours respectively. If an operator's average flight length deviates from the 
previous assumptions, the C-checks must be performed between every 3000 to 4600 
flight hours or 2000 to 2611 flight cycles. If a customer would not accumulate the 
amount of hours the aircraft must undergo the C-Check every 12 to 24 months. The 7th 
C-check is the equivalent to a D-check. To understand the importance of the remaining 
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life to the D-check Figure 26 presents the cost distribution of 7 B737 C-checks. The 
closer an aircraft comes to a D-check (7C), the lower its value. 
COST 
$1,400,000 
$1,200,000 
$1,000,000 
$800,000 
$600,000 
$400,000 
$200,000 
$-
C-check costs (every 3200 hours) 
B737-300 (MPD) 
• • • • • 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Source Aerospace Maintenance Cost Journa 
• 
6th 
May/June 
^ _ 
• • 
• 
• 
7th Ocheck 
1998 
Figure 26. C-Check Cycle. 
Maintenance cost of an engine show significant differences depending on the 
average cycle length. A V2500-A1 engine operated at 1 hour cycles requires $120 to 
$142 of maintenance cost per flight hour, while the same engine used on 3 hour cycles 
can be maintained for $68 to $81 per flight hour (Clark, 1998). An increase of 75% 
engine maintenance cost for a 3 to 1 hour average cycle length reduction also illustrates 
the importance of the hour to cycle ratio for the aircraft evaluation. 
Values of Aircraft configured with special technical equipment decline slower than those 
of standard versions. As can be seen in Figure 27, a B757 build in 1988 is as a basic 
version in 1997 30.4% less worth than the same type with better engines, increased gross 
90 
weight and extended range. The value of the "high spec" derivative kept about 72 % of 
its 1988 price while the value of the standard version declined to about 59%. 
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Figure 27. Impact of Technical Configuration on Aircraft Values. 
The examples listed above show how aircraft specific technical characteristics can 
have major implications for individual aircraft evaluations. The multitude of possible 
configurations and utilization combinations explains why it is hard to determine one 
single current market value for an aircraft type, when each individual aircraft is almost 
unique. 
The strict rules for documentation should make it relatively easy to evaluate the 
general maintenance status of an aircraft. However, the process of moving an aircraft to 
another operators maintenance program can create expensive bridging checks if the 
documentation of the previous owner is not transparent or standardized. One item of 
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bridging checks is the very expensive and in most transactions required horoscope 
analyses, which is the only technique to evaluate engines accurately. As mentioned 
before maintenance programs of different airlines may vary significantly. While some 
operators prefer the block maintenance plan, having accumulated major events, others 
divide the big checks and add the work to more frequent minor checks, called phased 
maintenance. The argument for phased checks is that the smaller work packages do not 
require the planning of extreme long downtimes in an aircraft utilization schedule. 
Components need to be made accessible only once and no work needs to be done two 
fold is said to be an advantage of block maintenance. Switching the aircraft from block to 
phase or vice versa can result in costly redundancy of work. 
Appraisers evaluate the aircraft's maintenance condition very often by comparing 
the performed maintenance with the MPD. Variations from the MPD resulting in more 
extensive bridging checks result in a lower value of the aircraft (Seymour, 1998). 
Since the aircraft is an asset and will most probably be sold after a certain time, the 
operator should view maintenance expenses as an investment rather than a cost. A part of 
the cost for high quality maintenance will be recovered from the higher sale proceeds 
while the airline simultaneously can uphold a high reliability of its fleet. A reliable 
aircraft also ensures on time performance, less delay cost and finally a higher customer 
satisfaction. 
High quality maintenance does not require any extravagant expenses or continuos 
upgrading of the aircraft. Modifications are justified if they improve the aircraft's 
efficiency in order to strengthen its future value. Reasonable upgradings are the 
installation of hushkitts or re-engining if the economical life becomes extended 
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sufficiently to create a return on the investment. Additional critical factors for the 
marketability are aircraft's compliance with service bulletins (SBs) and Airworthiness 
Directives (ADs). While service bulletins issued by the manufacturer are only optional or 
recommended, airworthiness directives declared from the aviation authority are 
mandatory in order to maintain the aircraft's airworthiness certification. 
3.2.6 Inflation 
In general inflation is an increase in the average price level. The data used to measure 
inflation are the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Producer Price Index, or the GDP 
deflator. The following figure shows the historical CPI development in the United States 
(Figure 28). The US index is the standard used in the aviation industry, since aircraft are 
traded in US Dollars. 
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Figure 28. Historical U.S. Inflation with Trendline. 
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Fitting a trend-line to the graph a general decrease can be recognized. According 
to the historical volatility and the current development of full employment with wages 
rising in the US there exists a chance for increasing inflation. It is not the purpose of this 
paper to address the different economical theories but to discuss the influence of inflation 
and its predictions on aircraft values. By taking the projected forecast of one appraiser at 
constant Dollars and discounting these values at different inflation rates significant 
variation of the values in current US Dollars can be found (Figure 29). By looking at the 
big difference between the values one can imagine what long-term implications a wrongly 
assumed inflation rate might have on forecasted values. 
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Figure 29. Impact of Inflation Rates on Straight Line Depreciated Aircraft Values. 
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amounts of money a variation of one percent inflation may easily result in a 10 to 15 
million deviation of the aircraft's future value. The prediction of future inflation is 
therefore an important part of the future value calculations. As inflation is important to 
all aspects of an economy, appraisers can take advantage of data published sources such 
as government agencies specialized in this topic. 
3.2.7 Switching costs 
All airlines offer in general the same product, a flight from A to B. Besides the 
age, carrier are using more or less the same aircraft, flying at the same speed, and making 
the same noise. To differentiate the product, airlines require highly customized cabin 
configurations to establish a recognizable and lasting corporate identity. The passenger 
does not associate the factors such as price, service, route network, or non stop 
connections with the aircraft itself The operators are willing to pay a high price because 
new aircraft are unique products designed according to the airline wishes. The high 
degree of customization may become a disadvantage when the aircraft will be sold. 
Besides technical variations, which do not need to be changed necessarily, the cabin 
configuration and design often needs to be adjusted to the new operator's corporate 
identity. Especially operating lessors are facing this problem frequently. But the 
different aircraft types combined with the variation in configuration make it hard to 
determine a specific price for the refurbishment of one aircraft type. While some airlines 
might want new cabin equipment others just want to have the language of signs changed 
or parts carrying the airlines logo adjusted. Sometimes technical changes are mandatory 
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due to requirements of a country's aviation authority. In the USA for example, the FAA 
requires TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoiding Systems) and wind-shear warning systems. 
According to an Airbus employee, even a minor adjustment costs generally around 
$100,000. Changing an aircraft from a two or three class into a single class seat 
configuration for charter operations costs around $0,5 million to $1 million. 
Very expensive becomes a reconfiguration if toilets and galleys need to be exchanged or 
repositioned. Therefore most airlines have these components just adjusted to their design. 
Galley refurbishment for a B737-200 costs around $60,000 while the new equipment 
would be three times as expensive and cost up to $175,000. 
According to FLS-Aerospace, ua standard 747 refurbishment consumes about 5000 to 
6000 man hours". At a rate of $45 per man hour this accumulates to $225,000 to 
$270,000 without any materials. The minimum work includes recovering and retrimming 
of the entire decor and bringing the interior to a serviceable condition with the minimum 
effort. Since most B747 operators have a similar cabin configuration, transactions 
involve in most cases only minor interior refurbishment as described before. But for 
major exchanges like the installation of new seats, passenger service units (PSUs), toilets 
and galleys for a B747, Pemco World Air Services estimates a downtime of 45 days. The 
installation would require about 3250 man hours or around $150,000. The material cost 
would amount to around $2 to $3 million. According to Airclaims a Cabin refurbishment 
of a 1972 B747-200 can accumulate to about $10 million. In a B737, the equipment 
could be installed within 20 days downtime and 1100 man hours. Another example 
where a B737-200 lay out was changed from a 109 seat to a 130-seat configuration, with 
new galleys and the rest of the cabin refurbished the labor accumulated to 5000 hours 
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(Juggling the hot coals of aircraft cabin refurbishment, 1997). These examples indicate 
that the cost for cabin refurbishment may vary for each individual case significantly. On 
top of the interior modification the transformation of an aircraft from the old maintenance 
plan to the new operator's maintenance plan, may impose a further big cost factor, known 
as bridging cost. Especially the switch from a block maintenance plan (complete D-
checks) to a phase maintenance plan (divided D-checks) can become extremely 
expensive. Depending on the amount a customer has to invest in the adaptation of an 
aircraft to its fleet he is willing to pay more or less for a used aircraft. 
3.2.8 Operating Cost development 
Depending on the airline's organization the cost structure varies considerably. 
Many variables as fuel price are not constant and are difficult to anticipate. Even though 
the fuel consumption is decreasing with technological advancement the price of fuel is 
volatile. Crew cost depends on the wage level and the power of the unions. 
A further share of the operating cost is covered by the maintenance of the aircraft. 
Ranging from 5% to 15%, maintenance costs also depend on many variables and are not 
consistent within the industry (Non-routine maintenance and the economic equation, 
1996). In low-income countries the composition of the maintenance cost is totally 
different to high-income countries like Germany. The cost for spare parts and 
components may differ significantly due to the exchange rate of a country's currency. 
Like aircraft, parts and components are traded in US dollars. Furthermore, the aviation 
authorities in different countries may require special maintenance programs. 
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Since it is impossible to take just an average or one example of the operating cost 
composition and analyze nominal values, it has more value to concentrate on the trends in 
the industry. Analyzing trends should enable one to extrapolate the future development 
of operating cost. Nobody can exactly predict how much an overhaul of a specific 
aircraft will cost in the future but looking at the historical cost development we should 
find trends for new and old technology. Further reasons for varying maintenance costs 
result from the fact that in low-income countries the pressure to increase productivity and 
optimize procedures is lower as in high-income countries. Due to the competition from 
low income countries and the cost pressure in the airline industry declining maintenance 
costs can be expected for the future. Another factor is the size of maintenance facilities 
resulting in different economies of scale. Furthermore, it needs to be analyzed how much 
maintenance cost become reduced by technological advancement of new aircraft. 
As a general result, we can say that according to the cost pressure on maintenance 
facilities and the technological development the maintenance cost are continuing to fall. 
It can be expected that this cost decline will slow down as long as there are not any major 
technology leaps. 
The maintenance for new aircraft finishing their prime life is expected to rise 
slower than old models did. For the base value the final implication would be that 
modern aircraft's economical life will be extended and due to the increased cash flow 
generating potential the values depreciate slower. That conclusion assumes all other 
variables constant and market equilibrium. 
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3.3 Forecasting uncertainty 
For large investments such as aircraft, the potential for an upside and the amount 
of risk a deal bears are very important factors for the investors. The parties involved like 
to measure the risk they are exposed to when financing or investing in aircraft. The 
standard deviation of the expected return used to measure risk. Aircraft future values are 
assumed to be normally distributed (Figure 30). With a standard deviation of ±1, the 
confidence level for predicting a future value is increased to 68%. 
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Figure 30. Normal Distribution. 
Being able to measure the risk by knowing the probability for a worst case 
scenario, investors can be attracted easier. Investors become more and more important 
since they provide the vast amount of capital needed to expand and replace airline fleets. 
Another possibility to measure the risk potential of an aircraft investment, is the analysis 
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of forecast accuracy. By looking at historical data, an appraiser's forecast accuracy and its 
standard deviation can be determined. Knowing the standard deviation of an appraiser's 
aircraft value forecast accuracy would make an appraisal much more valuable for an 
investor. 
Credit Lyonnais/PK Airfinance's SAFE model shows the standard deviation over 
the forecasting horizon. The initial standard deviation at the time t = 0 is derived from 
historical experience. Like other models for pricing options and derivatives the Brownian 
motion of stock prices theory is applied to the forecast of aircraft values (Hallerstrom, 
1998). This theory assumes that the standard deviation grows by a square root function of 
time. 
°to=J<v+ - ( c r , 2 -°"o2) 
*
 t]
 ( 15 ) 
Where ^ is the initial standard deviation at t = 0 and °"i is the standard deviation at 
t=t\ (CL/PK Airfmance, 1998). 
The growing standard deviation reflects the increase of the uncertainty the aircraft value 
prediction bears. Especially the anticipated timing of cycles becomes less accurate the 
longer a forecast horizon. With the hard to predict demand-cycle determining the aircraft 
value, the value forecast becomes less accurate the longer the forecast horizon becomes 
(Figure 31). 
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Figure 31. Decreasing Confidence Level for Longer Forecasting Horizons. 
Most aircraft value projections neglect information about the confidence level. 
Since many financial institutes are not capable of predicting aircraft values or evaluating 
appraisals, they depend heavily on the appraiser's judgment. The forecast accuracy and 
disunity in the appraisal industry will be discussed later in separate chapters. 
3.4 Forecasting models 
3.4.1 The Aircraft Value Analysis Company 
The forecasting model used by The Aircraft Value Analysis Company (AVAC) 
produces future and current market values. Various assumptions regarding world 
economy, air transport industry, and supply demand cycles are necessary to determine the 
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aircraft values. The values reflect transactions of single aircraft from willing sellers to 
willing buyers, paid in cash. 
Current Market Value: 
To a certain degree historical transaction data and list prices of new aircraft are 
included in the calculation of the aircraft values. But this data needs to be viewed 
critically, since list prices may include services and do not reflect the actual discounted 
prices airlines pay for the aircraft. Transaction data if available are not transparent 
enough to understand the specific details of a deal. Further factors for the evaluation of 
the aircraft are market penetration, position in the product life cycle, and the 
technological status. 
Future Values: 
After determining the economic service life of an aircraft, the future values are 
calculated by adjusting a reference value for anticipated world economic and aviation 
industry specific developments, with a maximum projection period of 15 years. The 
AVAC applies a Phase Analysis to project future values of aircraft. The model divides an 
aircraft's life into 5 to 7 periods, which can be stable, falling, or rising. During the first 
phase, the introduction of the aircraft, the aircraft value is rising during a boom and 
falling in a recession. In times of balanced seat and traffic growth the phases are 
considered to be stable. During its economical life an aircraft passes through 5 to 7 of 
these phases. To forecast the state of the economy, AVAC uses GDP, inflation, interest 
rates and oil prices published by Great Britain's clearing banks. The four variables are 
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main indicators to determine airlines' degrees of expansion. It is assumed that rising fuel 
prices and low interest rates make airlines acquiring rather new than used equipment. 
Especially the GDP growth is seen as an indicator for air traffic growth and airline's fleet 
expansion. For forecasts over eight years the model is giving a lower weight to the 
economic variables since the uncertainty rises with longer forecasting horizons. 
The forecasted GDP growth in combination with predicted yields and the degree 
of improvement is the foundation of the traffic growth calculations. In addition to the 
calculation of up and down swings, a constant is used to accommodate for the general 
trend of increasing traffic. Using the economical indicators and environmental 
regulations to find the number of future retirements, the demand for additional units is 
calculated. Comparing the demand for additional units and the output of new aircraft 
(backlog and production rates), the imbalance between supply and demand is found. 
Applying the economical variables and the aviation specific data, the base line of 
an aircraft's value depreciation is adjusted for the cyclical development of air traffic 
growth. Subsequently the values are adjusted according to an aircraft specific scoring 
system. The following factors are given different weight. The result is a figure used to 
adjust the initial base value upwards or downwards, representing the aircraft's potential 
for re-marketing: 
Table 7 
Factors Determining Aircraft Values 
> Average annual production > Number in service 
> Availability > Years since introduction 
> Number of operators > Specific age 
> Geographical distribution > Maintenance Status 
> New or derivative > Configuration 
> Commonality > Engine type 
> EFIS > ETOPs 
> Number of engines > MTOW 
> Proportion of lessors 
The final aircraft value curve is adjusted for the correlation between values and air 
traffic growth and aircraft specific re-marketing potential. The AVAC provides a best 
case and worst case scenario to accommodate for unpredictable future scenarios. 
3.4.2 Avmark 
The Avmark aircraft value forecasting model is based on the theory that the 
theoretical value of an aircraft depends on its revenue generating capacity. Avmark 
distinguishes between price and value of an aircraft. The price is a function of the value 
and the willingness of a buyer to pay for the profit generating potential. The willingness 
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to pay depends on many factors, but mainly on the stage in the industry cycle. Besides 
the cycle, the investors' confidence in the asset, cost of capital, demand for an aircraft 
type, availability of aircraft type, and marketability of the asset are considered important 
factors influencing the price. According to the imbalance of seat capacity the price 
continuously fluctuates around the theoretical value. A profit and loss analysis is 
conducted to build a calculation base assessing all future cost and revenues accruing to an 
aircraft type over its economic life. The data are translated into a profitability curve 
showing the base depreciation and the anticipated end of the aircraft's operating life. The 
basic assumptions consistent for every aircraft type are the as follows: 
> aircraft is in an overall good condition, 
> aircraft is deemed airworthy (AD, SB), 
> aircraft is maintained according to a maintenance program approved by a national 
regulatory authority, 
> aircraft has a standard configuration, 
> aircraft has been utilized on industry average, 
> aircraft is free of liens. 
The next step is to apply the aircraft's individual data to the model. For the 
seating capacity the industry average is assumed. The long-term load factors necessary to 
calculate the future revenues are derived from industry capacity forecasts. Regression 
analysis is used to project revenue yields for the different length of haul. Airspeed is also 
projected by regression analysis since distance and speed are supposed to be highly 
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correlated. Utilization is estimated because the number of cycles per day is determined 
by stage length while for the ground time average values can be used. The data for 
operating expenses, obtained from industry sources is also averaged. The lower 
maintenance cost for young aircraft and the increasing fuel consumption of old aircraft 
are taken into account. The fuel price is assumed to be constant over time. 
To find the net revenue generating potential of an aircraft passenger processing, 
general and administrative costs are also included in the model. Depreciation and interest 
cost are neglected since they are not closely related to the aircraft operation itself. The 
aircraft specific data and actual transaction data are applied to an initially developed 
aircraft profitability curve. In order to receive the final future values of the aircraft, 
current values are calculated by subsequently incorporating expected future inflation 
rates. Governmental and industry inflation predictions are applied to the different cost 
and revenue positions, averaged, and than translated into one future inflation rate. This 
rate is used to calculate the final future values in current dollars. Avmark is biannually 
publishing its final results in a statistical report called Transport Aircraft Values (TAV). 
Looking at the final plots of Avmark's forecasts, the depreciation patterns can be 
recognized (Figure 32). Despite the knowledge and the pretended application of up and 
down cycles in the forecasting model, Avmark's predictions do not show any cyclicality. 
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Figure 32. Avmark Aircraft Value Forecasts for Seven Different Aircraft Types. 
3.4.3 SAFE 
The prediction of future aircraft values is only one feature of the model developed 
by Credit Lyonnais /PK Airfinance, called SAFE (Statistical Aircraft Financing 
Evaluation). The model calculates future values to evaluate aircraft backed loans and 
investments. By changing the input variables the user is able to find the best constellation 
for his deal. There are four types of input necessary: Information about the aircraft, the 
cycle, the obligor, and the loan. 
To forecast future value for an individual aircraft, date of manufacture, type and 
current market value are required. To determine the position in the cycle, the date of the 
last recession, the anticipated date of the next recession and the date and amplitude of the 
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boom in between need to be inputted. A detailed result sheet shows both figures and 
graphics explaining the yield potential, the asset's future value uncertainty and the 
obligors default risk. Since the paper is discussing the prediction of aircraft future values, 
the author neglects the deal evaluation capabilities of SAFE. 
The model's aircraft future value calculation is based on 3 factors. First, the 
typical depreciation curve, discussed in chapter 3.2.1, determines the reference value. 
The reference value (RV) represents the revenue generating capacity and correspondingly 
the anticipated economical life of the asset. Concerning the age, the end of the prime life 
is important since the value is not degrading linear anymore but exponential from that 
point in time. As described in chapter 3, CL/PK has developed a mathematical formula 
to calculate the RV. CL/PK Airfinance used its' data base of historical transaction data to 
find the depreciation patterns and the RV formula. The reference value, which represents 
the net present value of the aircraft's cash flow generating capacity in constant Dollars, is 
subsequently adjusted for future inflation. The derived "inflation adjusted" reference 
value (LARV) is the base value, which is adjusted for the market development. Since the 
price of an aircraft is very elastic and driven by the ratio of demand and supply, the 
disharmony of orders and deliveries is resulting in a cyclical pattern of the prices over 
time. Values of some aircraft show a higher degree of correlation to the cycle than others. 
To compensate for that, SAFE uses a cycle sensitivity factor for each aircraft type. Two 
factors are mainly responsible for the aircraft's cycle sensitivity. Depending on operating 
economics and size, aircraft values stay relatively stable or swing heavily up and down 
over the economic life. Smaller aircraft with modern technology allowing more efficient 
operations because they can still generate positive cash flows when load factors are going 
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down. The high share of variable cost of older equipment requires high load factors to 
keep their operation profitable. In times of recessions it is obviously harder to fill up a 
wide-bodied aircraft than a narrow-body. Since the number of aircraft with more than 
230 seats represents only 26.9% of all aircraft grater than 50 seats, the chance for 
marketing these aircraft compared to narrow-bodies becomes smaller in times of over 
capacity (Boeing, 1998). This results in the values of wide-bodies falling faster than 
values of narrow-bodies, which are easier to be relocated. Conversely, as air traffic grows 
faster as seat capacity, even older wide-bodied aircraft can be flown efficiently. The 
relative shortage of wide-bodies compared to the narrow-bodies can result in a stronger 
upswing of their prices. Modern technology and low capacity make an aircraft value least 
volatile to the cycle. Depending on these factors, cycle sensitivity factors are applied to 
the aircraft type. Due to the uncertainty rising with the time horizon of the prediction, an 
exponential dampener reduces the cycle adjustment over time. 
Furthermore, SAFE does allocate Type Penalties to the different aircraft types in 
order to adjust for factors resulting in low market penetration. Aircraft, which have 
special characteristics, valuable only to a few operators, result in a value lower than the 
theoretical reference value. 
$30,000,000 00 r-
$25,000,000 00 
$20,000,000 00 
$15,000,000 00 
$10,000,000 00 
$5,000,000 00 
$0 00 -
Figure 33. Example of SAFE Aircraft Value Forecast. 
Figure 33 exhibits the incorporation of cyclicality in a SAFE aircraft value forecast. The 
following formula incorporates the factors described before. 
v(exp) = IARV X (1- S) X (1+p X C) ( 16 ) 
P = cycle sensitivity 
v(exp) = current fair market value 
IARV = inflation adjusted reference value 
8 = type penalty 
C = aircraft value cycle relative amplitude 
The inflation adjusted reference value, IARV is adjusted by the type penalty, 5. 
The higher the type penalty, the lower the value of the aircraft relative to the IARV. "A 
type penalty is applied for aircraft types that lack market penetration (few units delivered 
and few operators, hence poor liquidity), where the manufacturer has exited the business 
SAFE Forecast Result 
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(e.g. LI011)" (CL/PK Airfinance 1998). The cycle sensitivity P represents to what degree 
the aircraft value corresponds to the cycle. "Preliminary research shows that number of 
seats and operating economics are two important factors. Aircraft with high seat capacity 
and poor operating economics display large swings in value. Smaller aircraft of modern 
technology will show more modest swings, around 10-15%, based on our research." 
(CL/PK Airfinance 1998). 
The cycle is determined by the aircraft value cycle relative amplitude, C. SAFE 
uses segmented sinus curves to replicate the cycle" (CL/PK Airfinance 1998). In order to 
account for the growing uncertainty regarding the timing of the cycles in the future, C is 
reduced exponentially over time. As a result, values forecasted for the far future show 
less volatile amplitudes (Hallerstrom, 1998). 
i l l 
4 Analysis 
4.1 Historical forecast accuracy 
So far it was explained why it is important to forecast commercial aircraft values, 
how the values depreciate and which factors the industry assumes to drive aircraft values 
up or down. But especially for investors paying a lot of money for appraisals, in order to 
evaluate their risk exposure, it is important to know the accuracy of these predictions. In 
order to evaluate the risk of a specific deal, investors like to know the average error and 
the standard deviation of historic forecasts. If thoroughly analyzed, the historic accuracy 
is a good indicator of expected future forecast accuracy. For the methodology chosen it is 
necessary to have available the historic data of a series of consecutive forecasts. At 
CL/PK, the information in the right format was available for Avitas. In order to evaluate 
the SAFE forecast accuracy, historic forecasts needed to be simulated on the basis of 
assumptions made at the starting point of the forecasts in the year 1989. Since CL/PK is 
not a provider of appraisals, aircraft value predictions are only applied to each aircraft 
underlying a specific deal. It is possible to simulate historic forecasts by feeding 
inflation, cycle and aircraft specific data into the SAFE model (Statistical Aircraft 
Financing Evaluation). The forecast accuracy was conducted for the same 7 aircraft types 
(Table 1, Page 13) used in the survey analyzed in the following chapter 
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4.1.1 SAFE Forecast Accuracy 
Now that the methodology has been explained, the model will be applied to real 
forecasts. In the beginning CL/PK's SAFE model will be analyzed in regard to its 
forecast accuracy. Unfortunately there are not sufficient historic forecast data available. 
The reasons are that on the one hand CL/PK's SAFE software was not developed before 
the early nineties and on the other hand SAFE is applied to each deal specifically. Deal 
evaluation and aircraft value forecast are combined in one process. There is no database 
available including all historic forecasts, because the software is designed to produce 
always the most current forecasts applied to each deal at CL/PK. 
However, in SAFE it is possible to simulate forecasts starting any time in the past. 
The one and only downside of the simulation is that the results could be more accurate 
than an actual projection would have been because dates of downturns and booms, two of 
the SAFE inputs and major factors influencing the aircraft value, can be determined 
exactly for the past. The argument that justifies the use of these simulated forecasts is 
that the cycle were forecasted, based on the ratio of traffic growth and seat growth, where 
as the later is determined by relative inflexible and foreseeable aircraft production rates. 
The input assumptions are as close as possible to the expectations prevailing in the 
industry inl989. The forecasted values, actual values and the average errors with their 
corresponding standard deviations are available in graph format. Here, the final results of 
the SAFE forecast accuracy are discussed. It is important to bear in mind that the SAFE 
forecasts are compared with the current market values of Avitas. As discussed earlier, 
Avitas CMVs were assumed to be the correct trading values from 1989 to 1998 because 
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there are no consistant historic CMVs availble. The advantage of using Aviats' CMVs is 
that different forecasts can be evaluated on the same basis. 
The following two tables exhibit the mean of the error and the standard deviation 
of the error for each aircraft type and forecast horizon. Table 8 contains the mean of 
errors for each aircraft type and each forecast horizon. How the values were calculated is 
explained in Chapter 1.5. The analysis of the SAFE forecasts led to multiple negative 
error values. Negative errors indicate that the forecasted values for this specific forecast 
horizon were on average to low. Consequently, positive values represent an average 
upward deviation from the actual values. In order to get an overall understanding of the 
SAFE forecast accuracy the results of the individual aircraft analysis are summarized in 
two categories: Narrow-bodies and wide-bodies. By having only two categories, it is 
easier to compare the results of different forecasting models. The plots for each 
individual aircraft can be found in Appendix A. For the B747 the mean of the error was -
41% for a six month forecast horizon (Table 8). From Table 9 it can be learned that these 
mean error was not consistent since one standard deviation amounted to 35%. 
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Table 8 
Systematic Error of SAFE Historic Predictions for Different Forecasting Horizons 
Horizon 
Month 
0 
6 
12 
18 
24 
30 
36 
42 
48 
54 
60 
66 
72 
78 
84 
90 
96 
102 
108 
114 
Mean of Error for different forecast horizon by aircraft type 
B747 
0% 
-41% 
-43% 
-46% 
-47% 
-48% 
-44% 
-39% 
-34% 
-29% 
-28% 
-28% 
-37% 
-47% 
-59% 
-77% 
-86% 
-96% 
-110% 
-132% 
A300 
0% 
-45% 
-45% 
-43% 
-39% 
-30% 
-23% 
-16% 
-8% 
-3% 
-2% 
- 1 % 
0% 
-3% 
-5% 
-7% 
-14% 
-23% 
-36% 
-41% 
DC10 
0% 
-29% 
-27% 
-23% 
-18% 
-9% 
0% 
8% 
15% 
20% 
21% 
21% 
20% 
17% 
14% 
10% 
6% 
3% 
-2% 
-4% 
Wide-body 
A320 
0% 
-4% 
-3% 
- 1 % 
1% 
2% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
0% 
- 1 % 
1% 
4% 
5% 
2% 
3% 
0% 
0% 
MD83 
0% 
-16% 
-15% 
-15% 
-14% 
-12% 
-10% 
-9% 
-8% 
-7% 
-9% 
-10% 
-13% 
-15% 
-18% 
-19% 
-22% 
-25% 
-28% 
-30% 
B737 
0% 
-2% 
-3% 
-2% 
-2% 
0% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
0% 
-2% 
-4% 
-6% 
-8% 
-10% 
-14% 
-17% 
-21% 
-22% 
B757 
0% 
-14% 
-14% 
-13% 
-12% 
-11% 
-9% 
-8% 
-8% 
-7% 
-8% 
-8% 
-7% 
-8% 
-9% 
-10% 
-11% 
-11% 
-12% 
-11% 
Narrow-body 
In Table 9, the average value of one standard deviation of the error for each 
aircraft type and forecast horizon is listed. The standard deviation is the root mean 
square of the deviations from the mean. For normally distributed samples, 68.27% of the 
cases are included between one standard deviation on either side of the mean (Spiegel, 
1991). The standard deviation is helpful to understand the range of the data since the 
mean of two retrograde errors might be 0. In Table 8 as well as in Table 9 the values for 
the B747, A300 and DC10 (wide-bodies) are much higher than for the B737, B757, MD 
83 and A320 (narrow-bodies). Thus, a categorization of the data into wide- and narrow 
body is justified. 
Table 9 
Values for One Standard Deviation of SAFE Historic Predictions for Different 
Forecasting Horizons 
Horizon 
Month 
0 
6 
12 
18 
24 
30 
36 
42 
48 
54 
60 
66 
72 
78 
84 
90 
96 
102 
108 
114 
One Standard deviation 
B747 
0% 
35% 
36% 
39% 
44% 
50% 
49% 
46% 
43% 
36% 
34% 
3 1 % 
30% 
26% 
18% 
10% 
13% 
20% 
19% 
0% 
A300 
0% 
5 1 % 
5 1 % 
53% 
54% 
5 1 % 
46% 
40% 
3 1 % 
20% 
18% 
16% 
14% 
15% 
17% 
19% 
20% 
19% 
8% 
0% 
DC10 
0% 
4 1 % 
43% 
45% 
46% 
42% 
36% 
29% 
20% 
10% 
8% 
7% 
8% 
8% 
8% 
6% 
6% 
6% 
5% 
0% 
Wide-body 
A320 
0% 
7% 
7% 
7% 
6% 
6% 
7% 
8% 
8% 
7% 
6% 
3% 
6% 
6% 
4% 
3% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
MD83 
0% 
17% 
17% 
17% 
17% 
16% 
12% 
12% 
10% 
5% 
4% 
3% 
3% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
3% 
2% 
4% 
0% 
B737 
0% 
7% 
8% 
10% 
11% 
10% 
8% 
7% 
5% 
4% 
5% 
5% 
5% 
4% 
3% 
3% 
1% 
4% 
7% 
0% 
B757 
0% 
10% 
11% 
11% 
11% 
9% 
6% 
6% 
5% 
4% 
5% 
5% 
5% 
4% 
4% 
5% 
3% 
3% 
0% 
0% 
Narrow-body 
As was explained in Methodology, the statistical validity for longer forecast 
horizons decreases due to a reduction of data available. Therefore, the further discussion 
includes only the results of forecast horizons of up to 6 years or 72 month. Figure 34 
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shows the average forecast error sorted by aircraft category. The values forecasted for 
narrow-body jets show the lowest average error. The mean deviation of the SAFE 
forecast from the Avitas CMVs for narrow-body jets is fairly consistent. While for a 12 
month forecast horizon the error lies at about negative 9%, it is reduced to negative 4% 
for the 6 year forecast horizon. The trend of improved accuracy is also found for the 
wide-body aircraft. Averaging about negative 40% deviation for 12 month the error is 
reduced to about negative 30% for the 6 year forecast horizon. The tendency of negative 
errors, which indicate too low forecast results may be explained by the business 
characteristic of CL/PK. As a finance institute, it is reasonable to make conservative 
forecasts in order to reduce risk exposure. 
SAFE Forecasting Accuracy - by category 
(Narrow-Body NB - Wide-Body WB) 
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 months 
20% 
0% 
-20% 
-40% 
-60% 
f f 
-NB 
FiRure 34. SAFE Forecasting Accuracy. 
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While especially for the narrow-body jets the average forecast accurcy of SAFE is 
very high, the standard deviation needs to be examined, too. Only by analyzing the mean 
of the error together with the standard deviation, an absolute evaluation of a forecast can 
be accomplished. Figure 35 shows the mean of the error and the corresponding standard 
deviation for the narrow-body and wide body category. For both aircraft categories the 
standard deviations are consistent for different time horizons. While for the narrow-body 
forecasts the standard deviation lies in the 8% to 11% range, the error for the wide-bodies 
shows higher variations. Up to 48% is the standard deviation in this category. 
Forecasting Accuracy 
Systematic Error & Standard Deviation 
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 months 
20.00% 
0.00% ^ r ^ 
-20.00% 
^0.00% 
-60.00% -
-80.00% -
-100.00% 
-1 STDEV 
Figure 35. SAFE Systematic Error with +/- One Standard Devation. 
Resulting in a low systematic error while simultaneously the standard deviation remains 
close to 10% the SAFE forecast accuracy for narrow-body jets can be considered very 
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god. The wide-body values show a high standard deviation and a systematic error of 
close to 50% lower than the CMVs. One reason for the high deviations can be seen in 
Figure 36. The CMV, which are the starting points for each forecast, are very high in the 
early years of the forecast horizon. The significant drop of the first forecasted values 
indicates, that the Avitas CMVs are inflated in comparison to the values SAFE is based 
on. One of the reasons which would explain this difference is that there exists a time lag 
for CMVs. Due to the higher sensitivity of wide-body aircraft to the business cycle, the 
trading values for this equipment collapsed in the early nineties. While the SAFE 
simulation has no time lag the Avitas Blue Book values are probably delayed because of 
analyses time plus publishing time. 
MUSD 
70 
60 0 — C 
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40 
30 -
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1991 
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~ 
i 
1993 
—
v
 \ 
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Forecsted Values 
^-—u-^-o—^ - *•* ^ szr. r - x 
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Figure 36. B747-200 Avitas CMVs and SAFE Projections. 
Taking also into consideration that appraisers need some time before they receive 
and analyze information about actual transactions, which can also include a few months 
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of negotiations, aircraft evaluation and finalizing legal work, it might be easily a year 
before the full impact of economic changes is reflected in published current market 
values. When evaluating the high deviation of the SAFE forecast it is important to keep 
the time factor in mind. As can be seen in Figure 36, the SAFE forecasts reflect exactly 
the trends of the CMVs but are 2 years to early. In SAFE the values start to decrease in 
1990 wile Avitas' CMVs start to decrease in 1992. The consistent values for the SAFE 
standard deviations are important since it indicates the same variation for each forecast 
horizon. Each form of consistency is an advantage in financial risk evaluations. 
Therefore consistency of the standard deviation needs to be considered as an essential 
element of a forecasting model evaluation. 
In summary the SAFE model shows high accuracy for the narrow-body analysis. 
The wide-body forecasts are in general much lower than the Avitas CMVs. A publication 
time lag might be the explanation for the high deviations, since the consistent standard 
deviation and a qualitative analysis of Figure 36 indicate a good coverage of the business 
cycle. 
4.1.2 Avitas 
The Avitas forecast analysis is based on Blue Book values published from 1989 to 
1998. For the forecast accuracy evaluation the same criteria as for the SAFE model will 
be applied. The tables 11 and 12 present the mean of the error and the standard deviation 
for each aircraft type and forecast horizon. The format is the same as used in the 
previously conducted SAFE evaluation. As observed before, the average error for 
wide-body aircraft is bigger than for the narrow body models. 
Table 10 
Systematic Error of Avitas Historic Predictions for Different Forecasting Horizons 
Horizon 
Month 
0 
6 
12 
18 
24 
30 
36 
42 
48 
54 
60 
66 
72 
78 
84 
90 
96 
102 
108 
114 
Mean of Error (Avitas) 
B747 
0% 
4% 
11% 
13% 
16% 
20% 
27% 
34% 
4 1 % 
49% 
53% 
57% 
57% 
57% 
56% 
53% 
54% 
54% 
55% 
57% 
A300 
0% 
10% 
18% 
23% 
28% 
34% 
39% 
45% 
5 1 % 
55% 
59% 
62% 
64% 
65% 
66% 
66% 
65% 
65% 
62% 
63% 
DC10 
0% 
8% 
16% 
2 1 % 
26% 
32% 
37% 
43% 
48% 
52% 
55% 
59% 
60% 
6 1 % 
6 1 % 
6 1 % 
6 1 % 
6 1 % 
59% 
59% 
Wide-body 
A320 
0% 
2% 
6% 
7% 
8% 
8% 
9% 
9% 
9% 
10% 
11% 
14% 
18% 
19% 
2 1 % 
24% 
26% 
27% 
MD83 
0% 
2% 
4% 
6% 
9% 
11% 
14% 
16% 
18% 
22% 
24% 
27% 
27% 
28% 
29% 
30% 
3 1 % 
32% 
33% 
33% 
B737 
0% 
0% 
- 1 % 
0% 
1% 
3% 
5% 
7% 
8% 
10% 
11% 
13% 
15% 
14% 
14% 
13% 
12% 
12% 
11% 
14% 
B757 
0% 
2% 
5% 
6% 
7% 
9% 
11% 
12% 
13% 
15% 
16% 
18% 
2 1 % 
2 1 % 
22% 
2 1 % 
22% 
23% 
22% 
23% 
Narrow-body 
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Table 11 
Values for One Standard Deviation of Avitas Historic Predictions for Different 
Forecasting Horizons 
Horizon 
Month 
0 
6 
12 
18 
24 
30 
36 
42 
48 
54 
60 
66 
72 
78 
84 
90 
96 
102 
108 
114 
Standard Deviation (Avitas 
B747 
0% 
16% 
2 1 % 
26% 
3 1 % 
32% 
3 1 % 
28% 
24% 
16% 
12% 
9% 
7% 
6% 
6% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
0% 
A300 
0% 
11% 
15% 
17% 
19% 
20% 
19% 
18% 
15% 
11% 
10% 
8% 
5% 
4% 
3% 
3% 
4% 
4% 
1% 
0% 
DC10 
0% 
11% 
16% 
18% 
20% 
19% 
19% 
17% 
14% 
14% 
11% 
7% 
5% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
3% 
1% 
0% 
Wide-body 
A320 
0% 
7% 
9% 
10% 
12% 
15% 
16% 
15% 
13% 
12% 
12% 
8% 
3% 
2% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
MD83 
0% 
8% 
10% 
11% 
12% 
13% 
13% 
13% 
12% 
10% 
9% 
5% 
5% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
1 % 
0% 
B737 
0% 
9% 
13% 
14% 
16% 
17% 
17% 
16% 
15% 
13% 
12% 
9% 
5% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
4% 
0% 
B757 
0% 
5% 
7% 
8% 
8% 
8% 
7% 
8% 
7% 
6% 
6% 
5% 
3% 
3% 
4% 
5% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
0% 
Narrow-body 
The standard deviation (Table 11) of the error for Avitas forecasts is only slightly 
higher for the wide bodied aircraft. While the standard deviation of the error for most 
aircraft ranges from 10% to 20%, the B757 and B747 have very low and very high 
standard deviations respectively. The column of the A320 is not complete, because the 
model chosen is the youngest aircraft of this analysis. The model specified was built in 
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1991. Different from the SAFE evaluation is that the average error is positive for all 
aircraft types. Thus, the average of the forecasts for each specific time frame is too high. 
In the following graphs the results are summarized for wide-body and narrow-body 
aircraft (Figure 37). 
75% 
50% -
25% 
0% ^ 
0 
-25% 
Forecasting Accuracy - Systematic Error 
by category (Narrow-Body NB Wide-Body WB) 
^ ^ ^ ~ ~ WB 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ALL 
^ ^ . -—• —" NB 
T \~~- \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 
6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 months 
Figure 37. Avistas Forecasting Accuracy. 
As could be expected, the error for the wide-bodies is higher than for the narrow-
bodies. Interesting is that the average of the errors increases with the forecasting horizon 
expanding. For the SAFE model the error decreased for higher forecast horizons. While 
the average error is increasing the standard deviation (Figure 38) is decreasing for longer 
forecast horizons. Although similar for the narrow-body aircraft, the standard deviation 
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for wide-bodied aircraft is much smaller for the Avitas errors in comparison to the 
standard deviation of the SAFE errors for wide-bodied aircraft. 
AVITAS - Forecasting Accuracy 
Systematic Error & Standard Deviation 
- - +1 STDEV 
- -WB 
1STDEV 
+1 STDEV 
NB 
1STDEV 
months 
Figure 38. Avitas Systematic Error with +/- One Standard Devation. 
The B747 is chosen in order to evaluate the congruence of the Avitas forecasts 
and the business cycle. In Figure 39 it can be seen that the forecasts of Avitas are 
ultimately base values due to the straight-line characteristic. The downturn of the airline 
industry in the early nineties, which caused demand for high capacity equipment to drop 
dramatically, is not captured in these forecasts. Before 1992 and after 1995, forecasts and 
CMVs are close together. During the time of B747-200 values plunging, 1992 to 1995 
the forecasted values are considerably inflated. 
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
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Figure 39. B747-200 Avitas CMVs and Avitas Projections. 
Conclusively, Avitas forecasts for narrow-body aircraft values reveal a relatively 
good accuracy. Standard deviation and systematic error are mainly below 10%. However, 
the error is getting larger with the forecast horizon expanding. The same pattern is found 
for wide-body value forecasts. Though the error is increasing faster for the wide-body 
forecast. Interesting is, that the standard deviation for the wide-body value forecasts is 
very low compared to the SAFE wide-body forecast. An explanation for this 
phenomenon might be that the straight line characteristic of the forecast results in more 
consistent deviations. The important difference between the SAFE and the Avitas 
forecast technique is that in the SAFE forecasts the up and down swings of values are 
incorporated. The impact of the demand and supply imbalances in the market is applied 
to the evaluation of aircraft values. How good a forecast can be if the assumptions are 
correct, can be seen in Figure 40. 
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Figure 40. A320 Avitas CMVs with SAFE Projections. 
4.2 Disunity in the appraisal industry 
Who is right when it comes to aircraft values? This question can not be answered 
here. But it is possible to evaluate the appraisal industry as a whole. We said that current 
market values vary significantly and that the appraiser's values can be seen only as a 
benchmark. Pierre Casau, a member of Credit Agricole says: "We do not rely anymore 
on appraisers' values - they are just an indication" (O'Conner, 1994). As the following 
figure shows, the current market value estimates of several appraisers for the MD-83 vary 
from $15.66 million to $21.55 million (Figure 41). That is a high range for a relatively 
often-traded aircraft. A standard deviation of $0.76 million representing 10.2% of the 
mean is, from an investor's point of view, not very promising. 
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Appraiser's 1998 CMVs for the MD83 (YoB 
15.93 
16.9 
-1986) 
0 5 10 15 20 25 
Million $US 
Figure 41. Appraiser's Current Market Value Disagreement. 
Eleven of the most recognized appraisers in the industry provided the requested 
information. It must be mentioned that the data provided by the appraisers also include 
base values despite the request for trading values. But since the appraisals received are 
the same customers are buying, no differentiation was made in the analysis. As was 
expected after the historical forecasting accuracy analysis in the previous chapter, the 
author found that depending on the aircraft type forecasted values showed more or less 
variance. Aircraft more volatile and stronger correlated to the industry cycles are more 
difficult to evaluate than aircraft with less cycle sensitivity. Plotting the values of an old 
wide-body and young narrow-body, it can be clearly seen that the forecasted values for 
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the A320 are closer and more parallel than for the 747 (Figure 42) The bold lines 
running lower than the rest are projections calculated by SAFE. 
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Figure 42. Wide-Body and Narrow-Body Value Forecast 
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The SAFE values are added in order to show the contrast to the rest of the 
appraising industry. The both graphs represent the lowest and the highest standard 
deviations of all aircraft included in the survey. The forecasts for the remaining aircraft 
all show less harmony than the A320 but do not spread more than the B747 projections. 
Figure 43 displays the mean and ± one standard deviation for the two aircraft types. 
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Figure 43. Comparison of Mean and +/- One Standard Deviation of Two Aircraft 
Included in 1998 Appraiser Survey. 
Two appraisers submitting extremely high values were taken out of the analysis, 
since they might have represented especially equipped aircraft. The goal of the analysis is 
to show the disunity in the appraisal industry, but not any misleading extremes. From 
Figure 42 not only the disharmony of the appraisals can be found, but also the forecast 
technique. Besides the SAFE forecast, there is only one line reflecting the typical up and 
down swings of aircraft values. Although asked for the most likely trading values, some 
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appraisers might have either send only base values or they neglect cyclicality in their 
analysis. Without the consideration of the business cycle, appraisers underestimate the 
importance of short-term and long-term aircraft value fluctuations for the financial 
industry? While Airclaims and IBA incorporate some cyclicality in their forecasts only 
Paul Leighton's value show significant swings. The following graph (Figure 44) shows 
Paul Leighton's forecasts for the seven aircraft analyzed. 
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Figure 44. Survey Results From Paul Leighton. 
Mr. Leighton foresees less demand in the years 1999 and to 2002 followed by increased 
demand in the years 2003 and 2004. For 2007 and 2008, there appears to be another 
upswing in the forecasted aircraft values, indicating also increased demand. This type of 
forecast is very valuable for airlines and investors in order to evaluate the timing and risk 
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of investment decisions. However, it would be important to know also the historic 
forecast accuracy to have an understanding of the probability of the forecast to be correct. 
The majority of the appraisals received were straight-line forecast represented by 
one example in Figure 45. 
«•—-B-757-200-1990 
-•—•A320-200-1991 
A B-737-300-1989 
•N MD-83-1986 
DC-10-30-1978 
- -B-747-200B-
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A300B4-200 -
1982 
Figure 45. Example of Straight Line Survey Results. 
The following graph (Figure 46) exhibits the standard deviations, which reflect the 
appraiser's degree of disharmony, for the seven aircraft. The most variation in current and 
forecasted market values exists for the B747-200. Interesting is that the appraisers show 
disharmony in their appraisals for the B757, which is a narrow body aircraft and 
frequently traded. There are two possible explanations for the high standard deviations. 
On the on hand, some appraisers could have neglected that the values were requested for 
an ETOPS certified B757. On the other hand, the B757 is gaining popularity as a 
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candidate for cargo conversion. A reason for that is the phase out of B727 in the light of 
the emerging Stage III noise emission requirements. The forecasts of the values for the 
other two wide-bodies, the A300 and the DC-10, confirm a more unified opinion of the 
appraisers. As was expected, the predicted future values of the three most popular 
narrow-bodies, the MD83, the B737 and the A320 have very similar standard deviations, 
close to the $1 million level. 
Standard deviations by aircraft type 
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Figure 46. Standard Deviation of Survey Results by Aircraft Type. 
The charts of the value forecasts for each individual aircraft can be found in the 
appendix. The results of the future value survey can be summarized in one word: 
Disharmony. The current market values for the B747-200 manufactured in 1980 ranged 
from $20 to $37 million. The 10-year predictions for the year 2008 ranged from as low as 
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$4 million up to $16 million. Although the appraisers might have assumed different 
specifications of the aircraft for their appraisal, these variations are from an investor's 
perspective intolerable. In favor of the appraisers, it is important to mention that the high 
disharmony of the B747-200 was a unique case in the survey. For the other aircraft types, 
the variance of the forecasted values was much lower. 
4.3 Model / Sensitivity analysis 
Having analyzed the forecast accuracy of historic data and demonstrated a high 
disharmony in the expectation of future values, in this chapter the problems of the 
modeling process are presented. The results of a scenario analysis show the impact of 
variations in the main variables used to determine an aircraft's value. The second part of 
this chapter presents the result of a value determination for a B737 with the application of 
the NPV technique. The purpose of presenting this aircraft value determination is to 
show the difficulties involved in the application of the NPV model. The forecasting date 
chosen is 1985 so that it is possible to use historic operational data for the first half of the 
first 14 years (1985 to 1998) and forecasted data for the last 16 years of operation for a 
B737-300. The appliance off actual historic data is supposed to increase the accuracy of 
the modeling process. 
The first step in the analysis is the determination of historic and future available 
seat miles (ASMs). ASMs for the US airline industry are published in the Airline 
Monitor by aircraft type. By dividing the total annual ASMs of B737 by the number of 
B737's operated, the annual ASM for one aircraft can be found (Table 12). From the 
historical ASMs the future ASMs can be extrapolated. Figure 47 shows the trend line, 
which describes the future ASMs. The reduction of utilization for old equipment, which 
could only be estimated, is incorporated in the regression equation. An example for 
reduced utilization is United Airlines B737-200 fleet. The utilization for this aircraft type 
was 9.28 hours in 1986, 8.09 hours in 1992 and 7.40 hours in 1996 (LATA, 1987, 1993, 
1997). In 1992 the average age of the B737-200 fleet was 20.5 years (World Aviation 
Directory, 1994). Therefore, for the last ten years of operation (2005 to 2015) annual 
ASM for the B737-300 calculations decrease. 
Table 12 
Available Seat Miles for a Single B737 
Airline Monitor June 1997 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
ASM of B737 
US Industry 
3,921,900,000 
14,737,800,000 
28,621,500,000 
43,233,000,000 
54,328,300,000 
61,058,400,000 
63,031,800,000 
64,455,200,000 
65,647,600,000 
69,229,700,000 
75,225,100,000 
82,167,300,000 
87,663,900,000 
Number of 
B737 
25 
83 6 
169 2 
251 5 
313 
353 5 
373 7 
370 8 
380 8 
402 6 
439 5 
462 2 
481 3 
ASM for 
1 B737 
156,876,000 
176,289,474 
169,157,801 
171,900,596 
173,572,843 
172,725,318 
168,669,521 
173,827,400 
172,393,908 
171,956,533 
171,160,637 
177,774,340 
182,139,830 
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Figure 47. ASM forecast for a B737 built in 1985. 
The second step in the analysis is the examination of historic and future cash 
flows. The annual cash flow is the difference between revenues and costs. The Air 
Transport Association of America (ATA) publishes the historic revenues per ASM and 
the expenses per ASM for the US industry. Trendline regression aims relative good 
results for the expense and revenue forecasts (Figure 48). R-squared of 95.1% and 88.9% 
are considered sufficient for the purpose of this analysis. While the cyclical characteristic 
of the industry is neglected, it is assumed that in light of the long forecasting horizon the 
straight-line forecasts represents the average of actual future values. In order to test this 
assumption, actual historic data and calculated data will be used as input for the NPV-
calculations. 
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Figure 48. US-Airline Industry Revenue and Expense Trends. 
Despite lower utilization of narrow-body equipment and higher fuel cost due to 
higher cycle-hour ratios, the author assumes the direct operating cost per ASM for the 
B737, a new aircraft in 1985 to be very close to the industry average direct operating cost 
(Roberts, 1995). Therefore the average expenses per ASM from the ATA data does not 
require any adjustment. However, revenues per ASM vary significantly by stage length. 
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Figure 49. Graphical Determination of Revenue per ASM for B737. 
For B737-300 operations, averaging 596 miles stage length, the revenue per ASM is 20% 
above industry average (Figure 49). For the one-way ticket, the revenue per ASM is 15.8 
cents. B737-300 stage lengths, which are on average 236 miles shorter than the 832 miles 
average US airline stage length the revenue per ASM is 18.9 cents (First Equity). 
Although one way fares are used for the determination of the 20% revenue increase for 
shorter stage lengths in B737 operations, the author assumes that the same increase in 
percentage is valid for round trips. For the final aircraft value determination this revenue 
increase factor, called RIF from now on, will be critically evaluated in a subsequent 
sensitivity analysis. 
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Besides the discount rate, all data required for the NPV-analysis is available. A discount 
rate of 12%, representing the average cost of capital for airlines, is applied to the model 
(Morrel, 1997). The discount factor is also examined in the subsequent sensitivity 
analysis. The following two tables (Table 13 and Table 14) exhibit the variables used to 
find the annual cash flows. The summation of the discounted cash flows results in the 
NPV of the cash flows, representing the aircraft value. In Table 13, the actual data 
(expenses, revenues, ASM) are used for the years 1985 to 1997. At a discount rate of 
12%, the value of the B737-300 is $26.5 million. The actual value for a new B737-300 in 
1985 was according to the Airline Monitor $25,6 million. In order to find the impact of 
using the calculated straight-line data versus actual data the NPV was calculated with 
these data in Table 14. Applying the value of the B737 with theoretical data only aimed o 
$25.2 million. Although this one result has no statistical relevance, it still shows that in 
this specific case there is no significant difference between using actual and theoretical 
data. 
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Table 13 
NPV-Model for 1985 B737 with Actual Operating Data 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
I DISCOUNT RATE = 12% 
Revenue/ 
ASM 
$ 
0 085 
0 083 
0 088 
0 094 
0 101 
0 104 
0 105 
0 104 
0110 
0113 
0117 
0 122 
0 127 
0 124 
0 127 
0 130 
0 133 
0 136 
0 139 
0 142 
0 145 
0 147 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 165 
0 168 
0 171 
0 174 
Revenue + 
15% 
$ 
0 098 
0 096 
0 101 
0 108 
0116 
0119 
0 121 
0119 
0 126 
0 129 
0 135 
0 140 
0 146 
0 143 
0 146 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 160 
0 163 
0 166 
0 170 
0 173 
0 176 
0 180 
0 183 
0 186 
0 190 
0 193 
0 196 
0 200 
Expenses/ 
ASM 
$ 
0 083 
0 081 
0 084 
0 089 
0 099 
0 106 
0 108 
0 107 
0 108 
0 109 
0110 
0115 
0117 
0121 
0 124 
0 127 
0 129 
0 132 
0 135 
0 137 
0 140 
0 143 
0 146 
0 148 
0 151 
0 154 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 164 
0 167 
NPV = 
ASM 
156.876.000 
176.289.474 
169.157.801 
171,900.596 
173.572,843 
172.725.318 
168.669.521 
173.827,400 
172.393.908 
171.956.533 
171.160.637 
177.774.340 
182.139.830 
178.428.393 
178.842.506 
179.141.141 
179.324.297 
179.391.974 
179.344.173 
179.180.893 
178.902.135 
178.507.899 
177.998,183 
177.372.989 
176.632,317 
175.776,166 
174.804.537 
173.717.429 
172.514.842 
171.196,777 
169,763,233 
$26,449,994 
CF 
$ 2.413,022 
$ 2.583.484 
$ 2.872.681 
$ 3,301,566 
$ 3,096,382 
$ 2.239,549 
$ 2,237,853 
$ 2,142,112 
$ 3.155,039 
$ 3.499.169 
$ 4,251,281 
$ 4,581,802 
$ 5,300,024 
$ 3,859,406 
$ 3,981,928 
$ 4,102,332 
$ 4,220,397 
$ 4,335.904 
$ 4.448.632 
$ 4.558.362 
$ 4.664.873 
$ 4.767.946 
$ 4.867,360 
$ 4,962,896 
$ 5,054,334 
$ 5,141,453 
$ 5,224,034 
$ 5,301.856 
$ 5.374.700 
$ 5.442.346 
$ 5,504,573 
Table 14 
NPV-Model for 1985 B737 with Generated Operating Data 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
I DISCOUNT RATE = 12% 
Revenue/ 
ASM 
$ 
0 087 
0 089 
0 092 
0 095 
0 098 
0 101 
0104 
0107 
0110 
0113 
0116 
0 118 
0 121 
0 124 
0 127 
0130 
0 133 
0 136 
0 139 
0 142 
0 145 
0 147 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 165 
0 168 
0 171 
0 174 
Revenue + 
15% 
$ 
0 099 
0 103 
0 106 
0 109 
0113 
0116 
0119 
0 123 
0 126 
0129 
0 133 
0 136 
0 139 
0 143 
0 146 
0150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 160 
0 163 
0 166 
0 170 
0 173 
0 176 
0 180 
0 183 
0 186 
0 190 
0 193 
0 196 
0 200 
Expenses/ 
ASM 
$ 
0 086 
0 089 
0 092 
0 094 
0 097 
0 100 
' 0 102 
0 105 
0 108 
0110 
0113 
0116 
0119 
I 0 121 
0 124 
0 127 
0 129 
0 132 
0 135 
0 137 
0 140 
0 143 
0 146 
0 148 
0 151 
0 154 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 164 
0 167 
NPV = 
ASM 
162.536.374 
164,451.708 
166,251,564 
167,935,941 
169,504,840 
170.958.260 
172.296.201 
173.518,664 
! 174,625,649 
175,617,155 
176.493.182 
177.253,731 
177,898.801 
178.428.393 
178,842.506 
179.141.141 
179.324,297 
179,391,974 
179.344,173 
179.180,893 
178,902,135 
178.507,899 
177,998.183 
177.372.989 
176,632,317 
175,776,166 
174.804.537 
173,717.429 
172.514.842 
171.196.777 
169,763,233 
$25,165,345 
CF 
$ 2.173,924 
$ 2,303,968 
$ 2,434,754 
$ 2,566,061 
$ 2.697.670 
$ 2.829,359 
$ 2.960.910 
$ 3.092.103 
$ 3.222.716 
$ 3.352.531 
$ 3.481.328 
$ 3,608,886 
$ 3,734,985 
$ 3,859,406 
$ 3,981,928 
$ 4,102,332 
$ 4,220,397 
$ 4,335,904 
$ 4,448,632 
$ 4,558,362 
$ 4.664,873 
$ 4,767.946 
$ 4.867.360 
$ 4.962.896 
$ 5.054.334 
$ 5.141.453 
$ 5.224.034 
$ 5.301,856 
$ 5,374,700 
$ 5,442,346 
$ 5,504,573 
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Making some substantial assumptions in a model requires a critical analysis of the 
input variables. In the following sensitivity analysis the impact of changes in the discount 
rate and the RIF are examined. Figure 50 exhibits the results of the sensitivity analysis. 
If the discount rate is constant at 12 % and the RIF is changed, the aircraft values vary 
from $11.5 million to $34million. Thus shows a very high impact of the RIF on the 
aircraft's value in the model used. If the RIF is constant and the discount rate is altered, 
the values vary from $22.3 to $38 million. The discount rate, as can be expected for a 30-
year time frame, is also a main factor in the determination of the aircraft's value. 
B737-300 Values in 1985 
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Figure 50. B737 Values for Different Scenarios. 
It can be summarized that it is possible to calculate the value of an aircraft relative 
precisely. Forecasting the required variables by trendline-regression aims in the current 
analysis good results. However, the aircraft value is very much determined by two 
variables. The discount rate and the revenue increase factor applied for shorter flight 
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stages. These two variables have so much impact that a little variance can cause 
significant changes in the aircraft value. Therefore, the application of the NPV analysis 
requires a thorough understanding of the input variables. 
Since the model analyzed above is relative simple, not all variable determining an 
aircraft's value could be analyzed. Mr. Edmund Greenslet generously provided a more 
sophisticated NPV-model (Table 15). 
Table 15. 
Edmund Greenslet NPV-Model. 
B737-300 
Age in Years: 
Calendar Year: 
Yield 
Passenger Rev 
Cargo & Other 
Total Revenue (000) 
Flying Labor / Block 
Fuel per Gallon -
Fuel / Block 
Maintenance / 
Total / Block 
B H Cost -
Mkt , G&A 
Ownership 
Total Costs (000) 
Pretax Profit 
Pretax Margin 
Aircraft Value: k=12% 
Basic Value: $(000) 
PRESENT VALUE MODEL 
For an Aircraft whose Year of Build is 
1 
1969 
13 9 
15,56 
467 
16,028 
370 
55 8 
419 
87 
876 
3,15 
7,21 
2,80 
13,172 
2,85 
17 8 
27,134 
2 
1990 
14 3 
16,02 
481 
16,508 
383 
57 8 
433 
90 
906 
3,26 
7,42 
2,80 
13,499 
3,00 
18 2 
26,754 
3 
1991 
14 8 
16,50 
495 
17,004 
396 
59 8 
448 
93 
938 
3,37 
7,65 
2,80 
13,836 
3,16 
18 6 
26,220 
4 
1992 
15 2 
17,00 
510 
17,514 
410 
61 9 
464 
193 
1,06 
3,84 
7,88 
2,80 
14,532 
2,98 
17 0 
25,518 
198$ 
5 
1593 
15 7 
17,51 
525 
18,039 
425 
64 0 
480 
200 
1,10 
3,97 
8.11 
2.80 
14,903 
3,13 
17 4 
24,989 
) 
6 
1994 
16 1 
18,03 
541 
18,580 
439 
66 3 
497 
207 
1,14 
4,11 
8,36 
2,80 
15,285 
3,29 
17 7 
24,302 
7 
1595 
166 
18,58 
55/ 
19,13* 
455 
68 I 
5 1 ' 
42* 
1,39 
5,03 
8,61 
2.80 
16,451 
2,68 
14 ( 
23,92: 
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His model incorporates the various cost and revenue variables. In this version of the 
model 1993 data are used as base-values. These variables are altered according to 
escalation formula for previous and succeeding years. Table 15 exhibits the cash flow 
determination sheet for the first 7 years of a B737 build in 1989. The last row contains 
the NPV of future net cash flows representing the value of the aircraft. This model 
enables a scenario analysis since a lot of input variables are required. The variables 
chosen can be categorized in two groups: 
Revenue: Utilization, Load-factor, and Yield 
Expenses: Labor, Fuel, Maintenance, and Interest 
The different scenarios are applied to two aircraft types, a B737 build in 1989 and a B747 
build in 1980. In order to use a maximum operational life for both types 1989 is the date 
of the value determination. The scenarios chosen were an increase in each variable by 
5%, 10% and 15%. 
For each revenue-determining variables each scenario resulted in the same impact on the 
aircraft value. In the model a percentual changes in either of the variables utilization, 
load-factor, or yield results in the same change in total revenue. Therefore in Table 12, 
only one figure is representing the impact of these three variables. Due to an increase in 
revenue, the variation in the value is positive, too. Similar to the result of the previous 
chapter, relative small changes in revenue increase the value significantly. Only 5% 
change in revenue, result in 18.24% increased value for the B737 and 22.69% for the 
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older B747. Interesting, the value increases are proportional to the increase of the input 
variables. 
The increase in the cost variables caused the aircraft values to decrease. 
Compared to the impact of the revenue variables, changes in the cost variables are 
moderate. Labor, fuel and maintenance cost increases cause aircraft values to drop from 
2.53%> up to 9.77% for the B737. B747 values decline between 3.1% to 16.51%. From 
these three variables, the fuel price alterations have the strongest influence on the values. 
The changes of the discount factor appear to result in less variation of the aircraft value. 
The reason is that the changes are lower and the results are presented as percentage. For 
the B737 a change an increase of the discount facto to 13.8 % causes the value to drop 
from $27 million to $23.8 million. The variations of aircraft values due to the increased 
discount factors are not proportional to the change rate. For the B747 values the effect of 
the discount rate changes are more mOderate since the aircraft type was build in 1980 and 
is according to the model only operated for another 15 years. 
Table 16 
Scenario Analysis Results 
Impact on value in 1989 
B-737-300 
1989 
Utilization 
Loadfactor 
Yield 
Labor 
Fuel 
Maintenance 
discount 
factor k 
Variables changed by 
5% 10% 15% 
Value changed by 
18 24% 
-2 88% 
-3 26% 
-2 53% 
-4 42% 
36 49% 
-5 76% 
-6 5 1 % 
-5 05% 
-8 50% 
54 73% 
-8 64% 
-9 77% 
-7 58% 
-12 28% 
Impact on value in 1989 
B-747-200 
1980 
Utilization 
Loadfactor 
Yield 
Labor 
Fuel 
Maintenance 
discount 
factor k 
Variables changed by 
5% 10% 15% 
Value changed by 
22 69% 
-3 12% 
-5 50% 
-4 80% 
-3 28% 
45 39% 
-6 24% 
-11 01% 
-9 6 1 % 
-6 39% 
68 08% 
-9 36% 
-16 5 1 % 
-14 4 1 % 
-9 33% 
The main findings from the scenario analysis are that changes of revenues cause 
the most variation in the aircraft value. The relative small profit margin in the airline 
industry is another indicator for this result. Small changes in load-factors can result in 
operating below the break-even load factor for the airlines. Similar percentual changes in 
direct operating cost or capital cost cause less variation in aircraft values. An explanation 
might be that the direct operating costs represent m general less than 50% of total cost. 
Therefore, the values are less sensitive for changes in the direct cost variables. 
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5 Conclusion 
The growing aircraft leasing industry is the driving force for research related to 
aircraft values. In 1996 only 16% of the airlines owned all their fleet. The number of 
aircraft leased grew annually by 13% in the last two decades (Holden, 1998). The 
growing number of participants, financing aircraft through capital market transactions 
rely heavily on aircraft value appraisals. Aircraft appraisals and future value forecasts 
become more and more important. The market trends can be regarded as the initial 
motivation for this study. 
The net present value (NPV) concept is widely used for capital asset valuations. 
The examination of the NPV method application to aircraft valuation was the objective 
for this research paper. The goal was to demonstrate factors limiting the quality of NPV 
methods. In order to find these limitations the process of aircraft valuation was analyzed. 
Besides looking at the techniques used by different appraisers, an evaluation of the actual 
situation in the appraisal industry was performed. 
The industry evaluation was based on two methods. First the forecast accuracy 
was analyzed. Due to limitations in the availability of data, the forecast accuracy analysis 
was conducted for two models. Historic forecast data were available form Avitas. In 
order to evaluate the forecast accuracy, predicted values in the past were compared to 
current market values published bi-annually in the Avitas Blue Book. Data was available 
for seven aircraft types. The same analysis was performed for data from Credit 
Loynnais/PK Airfinance (CL/PK). CL/PK has developed a model with the acronym 
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SAFE (Statistical Aircraft Financing Evaluation). The software could be used to simulate 
historic forecasts for the same aircraft types used in the Avitas analysis. Knowing the 
deviations from the forecasted values to the historic actual market values, the average 
error for one, two and more years forecast horizons could be calculated. Also the 
standard deviation for each forecast horizon was determined. 
The Avitas results showed high deviations between the forecasts and actual 
values. For narrow-body jets, the systematic error was moderate and the forecast 
accuracy for wide-bodies was very low. Avitas systematic error increased gradually with 
the extension of the forecast horizon. The average narrow body value forecast error 
reached about 20% for a 5 year forecast horizon. For wide-bodies the average value 
forecast error was over 50% for a 5 year forecast horizon. The standard deviation for the 
wide-bodies ranged from 11% to 24% and for the narrow-bodies it ranged from 6% to 
14%. 
The SAFE forecasts showed less deviation from the actual values than Avitas' 
forecasts. The Narrow-body forecasts were close to the actual results and the systematic 
error was consistently around 10% for the forecast horizons of 1 to 5 years. For the wide-
bodied aircraft, the average errors reached up to 40%. With the extension of the forecast 
horizons the systematic errors became decreased slightly. The average errors were mainly 
negative which represents a conservative forecasting policy since the future values were 
under estimated. This can be explained because CL/PK as a financial institute, is risk 
averse and applies a more conservative assumptions to its' model. The standard 
deviations for the wide bodies were consistently at 40%, which is very high. For the 
narrow-bodies the standard deviation was much better and barely exceeded 5%. 
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The overall result of the forecasting accuracy analysis is that the forecast deviates 
considerably from the actual values. Only the narrow-body forecasts can be deemed 
acceptable. The values forecasted by SAFE were so much lower than Avitas1 actual 
historic Blue-Book values because the starting points of the forecasts in SAFE are already 
much lower. One reason for this is the Blue Book values are higher due to a publication 
time lag whereas the SAFE values directly correlate to the airline cycle. The knowledge 
of historic forecast accuracy and confidence intervals would guide investors in the 
evaluation of risk and rewards. Usually today's appraisals do not provide information 
about their historic forecast performance. The following statement backs up the previous 
result. "Appraiser estimates of future values are of limited use in financing aircraft over 
ten to fifteen year terms" (Holden, 1998). 
The second concern regarding appraiser's forecast quality is the results display a 
large spread. When asked for future values for 7 aircraft, exactly specified, the appraisers 
responses showed a high degree of variation. The value of the appraisers exhibited a 
standard deviation between $1 million and $5.5 million. This result coincides with a GE 
Capital Aviation Services study, which found: "Future value estimates for a 1992 B73-
300 vary by over two to one" (Holden, 1998). 
Another crucial finding from the survey was that most appraisers neglect that 
aircraft values are highly correlated to the airline's business cycle. Most appraisers 
publish only straight-line value depreciation patterns. In Airclaims' and IBA's forecasts, 
moderate swings could be recognized. It was only Paul Leighton, who incorporates 
cyclicality in his forecasts. Leighton's up and down swings match the one's predicted by 
CL/PK's SAFE model. 
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The third part of the analysis was concerned with NPV models and the impact 
fluctuations in variables. By applying industry average operating revenue and cost data, 
the net cash flows for the economic life of a B737-300 were predicted for an operating 
period from the year 1985 to 2015. Applying a revenue increase factor for shorter 
operating stage length of B737's and a discount factor of 12%, an aircraft value of $25.2 
million was determined. Using actual data for 1985 to 1997 and regression data for 1997 
to 2015 the value was slightly higher, $26,4 million. 
From the sensitivity analysis it could be learned that changes in both, the discount 
rate and the revenue increase factor have significant impact on the aircraft value. The 
changes were significant. This means that the net cash flows, predicted for 30 years are 
less reliable. Further research is required to find if the same results can be found for 
different aircraft types. A scenario analysis performed with a more sophisticated model, 
provided by Edmund Greenslet, the editor of The Airline Monitor, revealed the impact of 
changes in operating variables. The variables analyzed were load-factor, utilization, 
yield, labor cost, fuel cost, maintenance cost and the cost of capital. Examining, a B737-
300 and a B747-200, it was found that changes in load-factor, utilization or yield had the 
highest impact on the aircraft values. A 5% change in one of these variables resulted in 
18.2 % and 22.7% changes in value for the B737 and B747 respectively. The aircraft 
values were less sensitive for changes in the cost variables labor, fuel, maintenance or 
capital than for changes in the previous mentioned revenue determining variables. 
Changes of 5% in one of these factors resulted in variations of the value in the range of 
2.2%> to 5.5%. Higher changes resulted in proportionally higher variations in values. 
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During the work on this project, the need for further research was discovered. An 
analysis should be conducted in regard to exchange rates. First there might be a 
correlation between a weak dollar and the demand in countries outside the US. A weak 
dollar reduces the price for a buyer in another country. Such a study could also examine 
the impact of the single European currency and changes in the European tax legislation. 
Also, the expected operating time for modern jet aircraft should be addressed in future 
research. What is the impact of new materials, such as composites, and new 
technologies, such as fly-by-wire controls? What is the trend in maintenance cost going 
to be when today's new aircraft reach 20 or 25 years of age? Another interesting question 
is the impact of alliances on aircraft values. Is equipment going to be purchased in bulk 
and can capacity be shifted easier from region to region in case of demand variations? 
The topic aircraft value forecasting is as complex as the aviation industry and bears a lot 
of research potential for the future. 
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0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 164 
0 167 
NPV = 
ASM 
156.876.000 
176.289.474 
169.157,801 
171,900.596 
173.572.843 
172.725.318 
168.669.521 
173,827,400 
172.393.908 
171.956.533 
171,160,637 
177,774.340 
182.139.830 
178.428.393 
178,842,506 
179.141,141 
179,324.297 
179,391,974 
179.344.173 
179,180.893 
178,902.135 
178.507.899 
177.998.183 
177.372.989 
176,632.317 
175,776,166 
174,804,537 
173,717,429 
172.514.842 
171,196.777 
169,763,233 
$26,449,994 
CF 
$ 2,413.022 
$ 2,583,484 
$ 2.872,681 
$ 3.301,566 
$ 3,096,382 
$ 2,239,549 
$ 2,237.853 
$ 2,142,112 
$ 3,155.039 
$ 3,499,169 
$ 4,251,281 
$ 4,581,802 
$ 5,300,024 
$ 3,859,406 
$ 3,981,928 
$ 4,102,332 
$ 4,220,397 
$ 4,335,904 
$ 4,448,632 
$ 4,558,362 
$ 4,664,873 
$ 4,767,946 
$ 4,867,360 
$ 4,962,896 
$ 5,054,334 
$ 5.141,453 
$ 5,224,034 
$ 5,301,856 
$ 5,374,700 
$ 5,442,346 
$ 5,504,573 
DISCOUNT RATE = 12% 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
Revenue/ 
ASM 
$ 
0 087 
0 089 
0 092 
0 095 
0 098 
0 101 
0 104 
0 107 
0 110 
0 113 
0116 
0118 
0 121 
0 124 
0 127 
0 130 
0 133 
0 136 
0 139 
0 142 
0 145 
0 147 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 165 
0 168 
0 171 
0 174 
Revenue + 
15% 
$ 
0 099 
0 103 
0 106 
0 109 
0113 
0116 
0119 
0 123 
0 126 
0 129 
0 133 
0 136 
0 139 
0 143 
0 146 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 160 
0 163 
0 166 
0 170 
0 173 
0 176 
0 180 
0 183 
0 186 
0 190 
0 193 
0 196 
0 200 
Expenses/ 
ASM 
$ 
0 086 
0 089 
0 092 
0 094 
0 097 
0 100 
0 102 
0 105 
0 108 
0110 
0113 
0116 
0119 
0121 
0 124 
0 127 
0 129 
0 132 
0 135 
0 137 
0 140 
0 143 
0 146 
0 148 
0 151 
0 154 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 164 
0 167 
NPV = 
ASM 
162,536,374 
164,451,708 
166,251,564 
167,935,941 
169,504,840 
170,958,260 
172,296,201 
173,518,664 
174,625,649 
175.617,155 
176,493,182 
177,253,731 
177,898,801 
178,428,393 
178,842,506 
179,141,141 
179,324,297 
179,391,974 
179,344,173 
179,180,893 
178,902,135 
178,507,899 
177,998,183 
177,372,989 
176,632,317 
175,776,166 
174,804,537 
173,717,429 
172,514,842 
171,196,777 
169,763,233 
$25,165,345 
CF 
$ 2,173,924 
$ 2.303,968 
$ 2.434,754 
$ 2,566,061 
$ 2,697,670 
$ 2,829,359 
$ 2,960,910 
$ 3.092.103 
$ 3,222,716 
$ 3,352,531 
$ 3,481.328 
$ 3,608.886 
$ 3,734,985 
$ 3.859,406 
$ 3,981,928 
$ 4.102.332 
$ 4,220,397 
$ 4,335,904 
$ 4,448,632 
$ 4,558,362 
$ 4,664,873 
$ 4,767,946 
$ 4,867.360 
$ 4,962,896 
$ 5,054,334 
$ 5,141.453 
$ 5.224.034 
$ 5,301,856 
$ 5,374.700 
$ 5,442.346 
$ 5,504,573 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
I DISCOUNT RATE = 12% 
Revenue/ 
ASM 
0 085 
0 083 
0 088 
0 094 
0 101 
0 104 
0 105 
0 104 
0110 
0113 
0117 
0 122 
0 127 
0 124 
0 127 
0 130 
0 133 
0 136 
0 139 
0 142 
0 145 
0 147 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 165 
0 168 
0 171 
0 174 
Revenue + 
20% 
0 102 
0 100 
0 105 
0113 
0 122 
0 125 
0 126 
0 125 
0 132 
0 135 
0 141 
0 147 
0 153 
0 149 
0 153 
0 156 
0 159 
0 163 
0 166 
0 170 
0 173 
0 177 
0 180 
0 184 
0 187 
0 191 
0 194 
0 198 
0 201 
0 205 
0 208 
Expenses/ 
ASM 
0 083 
0 081 
0 084 
0 089 
0 099 
0 106 
0 108 
0 107 
0 108 
0 109 
0110 
0115 
0117 
0 121 
0 124 
0 127 
0 129 
0 132 
0 135 
0 137 
0 140 
0 143 
0 146 
0 148 
0 151 
0 154 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 164 
0 167 
NPV = 
ASM 
156,876,000 
176,289,474 
169,157,801 
171,900,596 
173,572,843 
172,725,318 
168,669,521 
173,827,400 
172,393.908 
171,956,533 
171,160,637 
177,774.340 
182,139,830 
178,428,393 
178,842,506 
179,141,141 
179,324,297 
179,391,974 
179,344,173 
179,180,893 
178,902,135 
178,507,899 
177,998,183 
177,372,989 
176,632,317 
175,776,166 
174,804,537 
173,717,429 
172,514,842 
171,196,777 
169,763,233 
$33,953,815 
CF 
$ 3,081,211 
$ 3,316,649 
$ 3,615.649 
$ 4.111,143 
$ 3,975.384 
$ 3,136,198 
$ 3,124,106 
$ 3,044,305 
$ 4,099,616 
$ 4,467,260 
$ 5.254,156 
$ 5.667.148 
$ 6,459,188 
$ 4.967.446 
$ 5.118.473 
$ 5.266.750 
$ 5,412,007 
$ 5.553.976 
$ 5,692,384 
$ 5,826,963 
$ 5.957.441 
$ 6.083.549 
$ 6,205.017 
$ 6,321.573 
$ 6.432.949 
$ 6.538.873 
$ 6.639.076 
$ 6,733,288 
$ 6,821,237 
$ 6,902.654 
$ 6,977,269 
DISCOUNT RATE = 12% 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
Revenue/ 
ASM 
0 085 
0 083 
0 088 
0 094 
0 101 
0 104 
0 105 
0 104 
0110 
0113 
0117 
0 122 
0 127 
0 124 
0 127 
0 130 
0 133 
0 136 
0 139 
0 142 
0 145 
0 147 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 165 
0 168 
0 171 
0 174 
Revenue + 
10% 
0 094 
0 091 
0 097 
0 104 
0111 
0114 
0116 
0114 
0 121 
0 124 
0 129 
0 134 
0 140 
0 137 
0 140 
0 143 
0 146 
0 149 
0 153 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 165 
0 169 
0 172 
0 175 
0 178 
0 181 
0 184 
0 188 
0 191 
Expenses/ 
ASM 
0 083 
0 081 
0 084 
0 089 
0 099 
0 106 
0 108 
0 107 
0 108 
0 109 
0110 
0115 
0117 
0 121 
0 124 
0 127 
0 129 
0 132 
0 135 
0 137 
0 140 
0 143 
0 146 
0 148 
0 151 
0 154 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 164 
NPV = 
ASM 
156,876,000 
176,289,474 
169,157,801 
171,900,596 
173,572,843 
172,725,318 
168,669,521 
173,827.400 
172,393,908 
171.956,533 
171,160,637 
177,774,340 
182,139,830 
178,428.393 
178.842.506 
179,141,141 
179,324,297 
179,391,974 
179,344,173 
179,180,893 
178,902,135 
178,507,899 
177,998,183 
177,372,989 
176,632,317 
175,776,166 
174,804,537 
173,717,429 
172.514,842 
171,196.777 
0 167| 169,763,233 
$18,946,173 
CF 
$ 1,744,833 
$ 1,850,319 
$ 2.129.713 
$ 2,491,989 
$ 2,217,381 
$ 1,342.899 
$ 1,351,600 
$ 1.239,920 
$ 2,210.461 
$ 2,531.079 
$ 3,248,405 
$ 3,496,456 
$ 4,140,861 
$ 2,751.366 
$ 2,845.384 
$ 2,937.915 
$ 3,028,787 
$ 3.117,833 
$ 3,204,880 
$ 3,289,761 
$ 3,372.305 
$ 3,452.343 
$ 3,529.704 
$ 3,604.219 
$ 3,675.719 
$ 3,744,032 
$ 3,808,991 
$ 3.870.424 
$ 3,928.163 
$ 3,982,037 
$ 4,031,877 
12% 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
Revenue/ 
ASM 
0 085 
0 083 
0 088 
0 094 
0 101 
0 104 
0 105 
0 104 
0110 
0113 
0117 
0 122 
0 127 
0 124 
0 127 
0 130 
0 133 
0 136 
0 139 
0 142 
0 145 
0 147 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 165 
0 168 
0 171 
0 174 
Revenue + 
5% 
0 089 
0 087 
0 092 
0 099 
0 106 
0 109 
0110 
0 109 
0115 
0118 
0 123 
0 128 
0 134 
0 130 
0 133 
0 137 
0 140 
0 143 
0 146 
0 149 
0 152 
0 155 
0 158 
0 161 
0 164 
0 167 
0 170 
0 173 
0 176 
0 179 
0 182 
Expenses/ 
ASM 
0 083 
0 081 
0 084 
0 089 
0 099 
0 106 
0 108 
0 107 
0 108 
0 109 
0110 
0115 
0117 
0 121 
0 124 
0 127 
0 129 
0 132 
0 135 
0 137 
0 140 
0 143 
0 146 
0 148 
0 151 
0 154 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 164 
0 167 
NPV = 
ASM 
156,876,000 
176,289,474 
169,157,801 
171,900.596 
173,572,843 
172,725,318 
168,669.521 
173,827.400 
172,393,908 
171,956,533 
171,160,637 
177,774,340 
182,139,830 
178,428.393 
178,842,506 
179,141,141 
179,324,297 
179,391,974 
179,344,173 
179,180,893 
178,902,135 
178,507,899 
177,998,183 
177,372,989 
176,632,317 
175,776,166 
174,804,537 
173,717,429 
172,514,842 
171,196,777 
169,763,233 
$11,442,351 
CF 
$ 1,076,644 
$ 1,117.154 
$ 1,386,745 
$ 1,682,412 
$ 1.338.379 
$ 446,249 
$ 465,347 
$ 337.727 
$ 1,265,883 
$ 1.562.988 
$ 2,245.530 
$ 2,411,109 
$ 2,981,697 
$ 1.643,325 
$ 1,708.840 
$ 1,773,497 
$ 1.837.177 
$ 1,899,761 
$ 1,961.129 
$ 2.021.160 
$ 2,079,737 
$ 2,136.740 
$ 2,192.048 
$ 2.245.542 
$ 2.297.103 
$ 2.346.612 
$ 2.393.948 
$ 2,438.993 
$ 2,481,626 
$ 2,521,729 
$ 2,559,181 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
I DISCOUNT RATE = 14% 
Revenue/ 
ASM 
0 085 
0 083 
0 088 
0 094 
0 101 
0 104 
0 105 
0 104 
0110 
0113 
0117 
0 122 
0 127 
0 124 
0 127 
0 130 
0 133 
0 136 
0 139 
0 142 
0 145 
0 147 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 165 
0 168 
0 171 
0 174 
Revenue + 
15% 
0 098 
0 096 
0 101 
0 108 
0116 
0119 
0 121 
0119 
0 126 
0 129 
0 135 
0 140 
0 146 
0 143 
0 146 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 160 
0 163 
0 166 
0 170 
0 173 
0 176 
0 180 
0 183 
0 186 
0 190 
0 193 
0 196 
0 200 
Expenses/ 
ASM 
0 083 
0 081 
0 084 
0 089 
0 099 
0 106 
0 108 
0 107 
0 108 
0 109 
0110 
0115 
0117 
0 121 
0 124 
0 127 
0 129 
0 132 
0 135 
0 137 
0 140 
0 143 
0 146 
0 148 
0 151 
0 154 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 164 
0 167 
NPV = 
ASM 
156,876,000 
176,289,474 
169,157,801 
171,900,596 
173,572,843 
172.725,318 
168,669,521 
173,827,400 
172,393,908 
171,956.533 
171,160,637 
177,774,340 
182,139,830 
178,428.393 
178,842.506 
179,141,141 
179,324,297 
179,391,974 
179,344,173 
179,180,893 
178,902,135 
178,507,899 
177.998,183 
177,372,989 
176,632,317 
175,776,166 
174.804,537 
173,717,429 
172,514,842 
171,196,777 
169,763,233 
$22,340,069 
CF 
$ 2,413,022 
$ 2,583,484 
$ 2,872.681 
$ 3,301,566 
$ 3,096.382 
$ 2.239.549 
$ 2,237,853 
$ 2.142.112 
$ 3.155,039 
$ 3,499,169 
$ 4,251,281 
$ 4,581,802 
$ 5,300,024 
$ 3.859.406 
$ 3,981.928 
$ 4,102,332 
$ 4.220.397 
$ 4,335,904 
$ 4.448,632 
$ 4,558.362 
$ 4,664.873 
$ 4,767.946 
$ 4.867.360 
$ 4,962.896 
$ 5,054,334 
$ 5,141.453 
$ 5.224.034 
$ 5.301.856 
$ 5,374.700 
$ 5,442.346 
$ 5,504,573 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
I DISCOUNT RATE - 10% 
Revenue/ 
ASM 
0 085 
0 083 
0 088 
0 094 
0 101 
0 104 
0 105 
0 104 
0110 
0113 
0117 
0 122 
0 127 
0 124 
0 127 
0 130 
0 133 
0 136 
0 139 
0 142 
0 145 
0 147 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 165 
0 168 
0 171 
0 174 
Revenue + 
15% 
0 098 
0 096 
0 101 
0 108 
0116 
0119 
0 121 
0119 
0 126 
0 129 
0 135 
0 140 
0 146 
0 143 
0 146 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 160 
0 163 
0 166 
0 170 
0 173 
0 176 
0 180 
0 183 
0 186 
0 190 
0 193 
0 196 
0 200 
Expenses/ 
ASM 
0 083 
0 081 
0 084 
0 089 
0 099 
0 106 
0 108 
0 107 
0 108 
0 109 
0110 
0115 
0117 
0 121 
0 124 
0 127 
0 129 
0 132 
0 135 
0 137 
0 140 
0 143 
0 146 
0 148 
0 151 
0 154 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 164 
0 167 
NPV = 
ASM 
156.876.000 
176,289,474 
169.157.801 
171.900.596 
173,572.843 
172.725,318 
168,669.521 
173.827.400 
172,393.908 
171.956.533 
171.160.637 
177.774,340 
182,139,830 
178.428,393 
178.842,506 
179,141,141 
179.324,297 
179,391,974 
179,344,173 
179.180,893 
178,902.135 
178,507.899 
177,998.183 
177,372.989 
176,632.317 
175,776,166 
174,804.537 
173,717.429 
172.514,842 
171,196,777 
169,763,233 
$31,995,995 
CF 
$ 2,413,022 
$ 2,583,484 
$ 2,872,681 
$ 3.301,566 
$ 3,096,382 
$ 2,239,549 
$ 2.237,853 
$ 2,142,112 
$ 3,155,039 
$ 3.499,169 
$ 4.251,281 
$ 4.581,802 
$ 5.300.024 
$ 3.859.406 
$ 3,981,928 
$ 4.102.332 
$ 4.220,397 
$ 4.335,904 
$ 4,448,632 
$ 4,558,362 
$ 4,664,873 
$ 4,767,946 
$ 4,867,360 
$ 4,962,896 
$ 5,054,334 
$ 5,141,453 
$ 5,224,034 
$ 5,301,856 
$ 5,374,700 
$ 5,442,346 
$ 5,504,573 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
Revenue/ 
ASM 
0 087 
0 089 
0 092 
0 095 
0 098 
0 101 
0 104 
0 107 
0110 
0113 
0116 
0118 
0 121 
0.124 
0 127 
0 130 
0 133 
0 136 
0 139 
0 142 
0 145 
0 147 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 165 
0 168 
0 171 
0 174 
Revenue + 
15% 
0 099 
0 103 
0 106 
0 109 
0113 
0116 
0119 
0 123 
0 126 
0 129 
0 133 
0 136 
0 139 
0 143 
0 146 
0 150 
0 153 
0 156 
0 160 
0 163 
0 166 
0 170 
0 173 
0 176 
0 180 
0 183 
0 186 
0 190 
0 193 
0 196 
0 200 
DISCOUNT RATE = 
Expenses/ 
ASM 
NPV = 
ASM 
0 086 
0 089 
0 092 
0 094 
0 097 
0 100 
0 102 
0 105 
0 108 
0110 
0113 
0116 
0119 
0 121 
0 124 
0 127 
0 129 
0 132 
0 135 
0 137 
0 140 
0 143 
0 146 
0 148 
0 151 
0 154 
0 156 
0 159 
0 162 
0 164 
0 167 
162,536,374 
164,451,708 
166,251.564 
167,935,941 
169,504,840 
170,958,260 
172,296,201 
173,518,664 
174,625,649 
175,617,155 
176,493,182 
177,253,731 
177,898,801 
178,428,393 
178,842.506 
179,141,141 
179,324,297 
179,391,974 
179,344,173 
179,180,893 
178,902,135 
178,507,899 
177,998,183 
177,372,989 
176,632,317 
175,776,166 
174,804,537 
173,717,429 
172,514,842 
171,196,777 
169,763,233 
8% 
$38,031,308 
CF 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
? 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
? 
$ 
$ 
? 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
2,173,924 
2,303,968 
2.434,754 
2,566,061 
2,697,670 
2,829,359 
2,960,910 
3,092,103 
3,222,716 
3,352.531 
3,481,328 
3,608,886 
3,734,985 
3,859.406 
3,981,928 
4,102.332 
4,220.397 
4,335,904 
4,448,632 
4,558.362 
4,664,873 
4,767,946 
4,867.360 
4,962,896 
5,054,334 
5,141,453 
5,224,034 
5,301,856 
5,374,700 
5,442,346 
5,504,573 
